

# 在Catalyst 9000系列交换机上实施BGP EVPN DHCP第2层中继

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# 简介

本文档介绍如何配置、验证EVPN VxLAN DHCP L2中继功能并对其进行故障排除。

## 先决条件

### 要求

- 此功能用于任何使用DHCP的CGW类型部署
- 如果实施受保护分段，请查阅这些文档
  - [在Catalyst 9000系列交换机上实施BGP EVPN路由策略](#)
  - [在Catalyst 9000系列交换机上实施BGP EVPN保护的重叠分段](#)

### 使用的组件

本文档中的信息基于以下软件和硬件版本：

- Catalyst 9300
- Catalyst 9400
- Catalyst 9500
- Catalyst 9600
- Cisco IOS® XE 17.12.1及更高版本

本文档中的信息都是基于特定实验室环境中的设备编写的。本文档中使用的所有设备最初均采用原始（默认）配置。如果您的网络处于活动状态，请确保您了解所有命令的潜在影响。

## 背景信息

### 文档详细信息

本文档可用于任何CGW部署，其中DHCP需要从没有SVI的枝叶中继到中央网关。

- 如果未使用受保护的分段，请使用文档中将SVI通告到交换矩阵的部分

如果要实施受保护分段，本文档是3个相互关联的文档的第2部分：

- 文档1：[在Catalyst 9000系列交换机上实施BGP EVPN路由策略](#)介绍了如何控制重叠中的BGP BUM流量，必须首先进行配置
- 文档2：[在Catalyst 9000系列交换机上实施BGP EVPN保护的重叠分段](#)在文档1的重叠设计和策略的基础上构建，描述“protected”关键字的实施。
- 文档3：本文档。在前两个文档之上构建，描述仅使用第2层枝叶和CGW实施DHCP中继的方式

### L2中继行为

中继	监听	核心泛洪	访问泛洪	IPv4
是	是	否	是	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>选项82子选项：(1)代理电路ID (vni-mod-port)使用dhcp监听填充</li> <li>您可以使用dhcp trust配置限制接入端</li> </ul> *推荐的型号
是	否	是	是	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>选项82子选项：(1)代理电路ID (vlan-mod-port)使用dhcp监听填充</li> </ul>
否	是	否	是	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>选项82子选项：(1)代理电路ID (vni-mod-port)使用dhcp监听填充</li> <li>您可以使用dhcp trust配置限制接入端</li> </ul>
中继	监听	核心泛洪	访问泛洪	IPv6
是	是	是	是	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>选项82子选项：(1)代理电路ID (vni-mod-port)使用dhcp监听填充</li> <li>您可以使用dhcp trust配置限制接入端</li> </ul>
是	否	是	是	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>选项82子选项：(1)代理电路ID (vlan-mod-port)使用dhcp监听填充</li> </ul>
否	是	是	是	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>选项82子选项：(1)代理电路ID (vni-mod-port)使用dhcp监听填充</li> <li>您可以使用dhcp trust配置限制接入端</li> </ul>
否	否	是	是	


## 术语


VRF	虚拟路由转发	定义与其他VRF和全局IPv4/IPv6路由域分离的第3层路由域
AF	地址系列	定义BGP处理的前缀类型和路由信息

AS	自治系统	一组属于一个网络或一组网络的可路由IP前缀，全部由单个实体或组织管理、控制和监督
EVPN	以太网虚拟专用网络	允许BGP传输第2层MAC和第3层IP信息的扩展是EVPN，并使用多协议边界网关协议(MP-BGP)作为协议来分发有关VXLAN重叠网络的可达性信息。
VXLAN	虚拟可扩展LAN ( 局域网 )	VXLAN旨在克服VLAN和STP的固有局限性。推荐的IETF标准[RFC 7348]与VLAN提供相同的以太网第2层网络服务，但灵活性更高。从功能上讲，它是MAC-in-UDP封装协议，在第3层底层网络上作为虚拟重叠运行。
CGW	集中式网关	以及网关SVI不在每个枝叶上的EVPN的实施。相反，所有路由都由使用非对称IRB ( 集成路由和桥接 ) 的特定枝叶完成
DEF网关	默认网关	通过“l2vpn evpn”配置部分下的“default-gateway advertise enable”命令添加到MAC/IP前缀的BGP扩展社区属性。
IMET (RT3)	包括组播以太网标记 ( 路由 )	也称为BGP类型3路由。此路由类型在EVPN中用于在VTEP之间传输BUM ( 广播/未知单播/组播 ) 流量。
RT2	路由类型2	BGP MAC或MAC/IP前缀，表示主机MAC或网关MAC-IP
EVPN经理	EVPN管理器	用于各种其他组件的中央管理组件 ( 例如：从SISF获知并向L2RIB发送信号 )
SISF	交换机集成安全功能	EVPN使用的不可知主机跟踪表，用于了解枝叶上的本地主机
L2RIB	第2层路由信息库	在用于管理BGP、EVPN管理器、L2FIB之间交互的中间组件中
FED	转发引擎驱动程序	对ASIC ( 硬件 ) 层进行编程
MATM	Mac地址表管理器	IOS MATM：仅安装本地地址和 FED MATM：硬件表，安装从控制平面获知的本地和远程地址，是硬件转发平面的一部分

# 配置 ( 标准CGW部署 )

## 网络图





注意：本部分介绍不使用受保护功能的标准CGW部署。

- 显示DHCP DORA数据包交换的调试仅在受保护网段示例中显示

---

## L2 VTEP ( 枝叶 ) 密钥详细信息

请求数据包来自客户端

- 使用Default gw advertised CGW mac。
- 如果存在多个gw，则使用第一个gw mac。
- 将外部广播MAC ( 客户端发起：DORA中的D和R ) 转换为单播GW MAC并转发到CGW

DHCP监听添加：选项82子选项：电路和RID

( RID由CGW上的响应数据包处理使用 )。

(通知CGW其非本地和交换矩阵中继返回L2VTEP)

<#root>

```
Option: (82) Agent Information Option
  Length: 24
  Option 82 Suboption: (1) Agent Circuit ID
    Length: 12
    Agent Circuit ID: 010a00080000277501010000

  Option 82 Suboption: (2) Agent Remote ID
    Length: 8
    Agent Remote ID:
    000
```

```
682c7bf88700 <-- switch base mac 682c.7bf8.8700 (from 'show switch')
```

- 通过vxlan隧道从CGW接收的响应数据包。
- Leaf Strips选项82。
- 添加带有客户端源接口的绑定条目。( vxlan-mod-port提供客户端源接口 )。
- 转发到客户端的响应数据包。

### L3 VTEP (CGW)密钥详细信息

- 启用DHCP监听
- 在SVI中启用DHCP中继
- 从L2VTEP接收请求，并将其提供给中继。
- 中继添加其他选项82子选项 ( gi、服务器覆盖等 ) 并发送到DHCP服务器。
- 来自dhcp服务器的DHCP响应首先进入RELAY组件。
- 在RELAY删除选项82参数 ( gi地址、服务器覆盖等 ) 后，数据包将传递到dhcp监听组件。
- 监听组件检查RID ( 路由器ID )，如果它不是本地路由器，则不会删除选项82子选项1和2。
- 交换矩阵中继 ( 因为RID不是本地的 ) 数据包直接转发到远程客户端。
- 使用客户端Mac并执行网桥插入。 硬件执行客户端mac查找，并将具有vxlan封装的数据包转发到始发L2VTEP。

## L2VTEP

### 配置evpn实例

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf-01#
```

```
show run | beg l2vpn evpn instance 201
```

```
l2vpn evpn instance 201 vlan-based  
encapsulation vxlan  
replication-type ingress
```

### 启用DHCP监听

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf-01#
```

```
show run | sec dhcp snoop
```

```
ip dhcp snooping vlan 101,  
201
```

```
ip dhcp snooping
```

## CGW

### 配置evpn实例

```
<#root>
```

```
Border#
```


```
sh run | s l2vpn evpn instance 201
```

```
l2vpn evpn instance 201 vlan-based  
encapsulation vxlan  
replication-type ingress
```

```
default-gateway advertise enable <-- Enable to add BGP DEF GW ext. community attribute
```



---



注意：DEF GW属性对于L2中继了解要将DHCP数据包封装和发送到谁至关重要。

---

## 启用DHCP监听

```
<#root>
```

```
Border#
```

```
sh run | s dhcp snoop
```

```
ip dhcp snooping vlan 101,
```

```
201
```

```
ip dhcp snooping
```

确保DHCP中继的配置正确以处理其他选项

```
<#root>
```

```
Border#
```

```
sh run int vl 201
```

```
Building configuration...
```

```
interface Vlan201
```

```
  mac-address 0000.beef.cafe
```

```
  vrf forwarding red
```

```
  ip dhcp relay information option vpn-id <-- Ensure the vrf info is passed to the server
```

```
ip dhcp relay source-interface Loopback0 <-- Sets the relay source interface to the loopback
```

```
ip address 10.1.201.1 255.255.255.0
```

```
ip helper-address global 10.1.33.33 <-- In this scenario the DHCP server is in the global routing t
```

## 验证 ( 标准CGW部署 )

### 网关前缀 ( 枝叶 )

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf-01#
```

```
sh bgp l2vpn evpn route-type 2 0 0000.beef.cafe 10.1.201.1
```

```
BGP routing table entry for [2][172.16.255.3:201][0][48][0000BEEFCAFE][32][10.1.201.1]/24, version 8964  
Paths: (1 available, best #1,
```

```
table evi_201
```

```
)
```

```
<-- In the EVI context for the segment
```

```
Not advertised to any peer
```

```
Refresh Epoch 3
```

```
Local, imported path from [2][172.16.255.6:201][0][48][0000BEEFCAFE][32][10.1.201.1]/24 (global)
```

```
  172.16.255.6 (metric 30) (via default) from 172.16.255.1 (172.16.255.1)
```

```
    Origin incomplete, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, internal, best
```

```
    EVPN ESI: 00000000000000000000,
```

```
Label1 20101
```

```
<-- Correct segment ID
```

```
Extended Community: RT:65001:201 ENCAP:8
```

```
EVPN DEF GW:0:0 <-- GW attribute added indicating this is GW prefix which L2 Relay uses
```

Originator: 172.16.255.6

, Cluster list: 172.16.255.1

<-- Learned from the Border (CGW)

rx pathid: 0, tx pathid: 0x0  
Updated on Nov 14 2023 16:06:40 UTC

## FED MATM ( 枝叶 )

<#root>

Leaf-01#

show platform software fed switch active matm macTable vlan 201

VLAN	MAC	Type	Seq#	EC_Bi	Flags	machandle	siHandle	riHandl
201	0006.f601.cd42	0x1	32436	0	0	0x71e058dc3368	0x71e058655018	0x0
201	0006.f601.cd01	0x1	32437	0	0	0x71e058dae308	0x71e058655018	0x0
201	0000.beef.cafe	0x5000001						
	0 0 64	0x71e059177138		0x71e058eeb418		0x71e058df81f8	0x0	

VTEP 172.16.255.6 adj\_id 1371

No

<--- The GW MAC shows learnt via the Border Leaf Loopback with the right flags

Total Mac number of addresses:: 3

Summary:

Total number of secure addresses:: 0

Total number of drop addresses:: 0

Total number of lisp local addresses:: 0

Total number of lisp remote addresses:: 1 <---

\*a\_time=aging\_time(secs) \*e\_time=total\_elapsed\_time(secs)

Type:

MAT\_DYNAMIC\_ADDR 0x1

MAT\_STATIC\_ADDR 0x2 MAT\_CPU\_ADDR 0x4 MAT\_DISCARD\_ADDR 0x8

MAT\_ALL\_VLANS 0x10 MAT\_NO\_FORWARD 0x20 MAT\_IPMULT\_ADDR 0x40 MAT\_RES

```

MAT_DO_NOT_AGE          0x100  MAT_SECURE_ADDR          0x200  MAT_NO_PORT            0x400  MAT_DRO
MAT_DUP_ADDR           0x1000  MAT_NULL_DESTINATION     0x2000  MAT_DOT1X_ADDR        0x4000  MAT_ROU
MAT_WIRELESS_ADDR     0x10000  MAT_SECURE_CFG_ADDR     0x20000  MAT_OPQ_DATA_PRESENT  0x40000  MAT_WIR
MAT_DLR_ADDR          0x100000  MAT_MRP_ADDR            0x200000  MAT_MSRP_ADDR        0x400000  MAT_LIS

MAT_LISP_REMOTE_ADDR  0x1000000

    MAT_VPLS_ADDR      0x2000000

MAT_LISP_GW_ADDR      0x4000000          <-- these 3 values added = 0x5000001 (not

```

## 本地MAC ( 枝叶 )

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf-01#
```

```
show switch
```

```
Switch/Stack Mac Address : 682c.7bf8.8700 - Local Mac Address
Mac persistency wait time: Indefinite
```

Switch#	Role	Mac Address	Priority	H/W Version	Current State
*1	Active				
-----					
682c.7bf8.8700					
1	V01	Ready			

```

<--- Use to validate the Agent ID in DHCP Option 82

```

## DHCP监听 ( 枝叶和CGW )

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf-01#
```

```
show ip dhcp snooping
```

```
Switch DHCP snooping is enabled
```

```
Switch DHCP gleaning is disabled
DHCP snooping is configured on following VLANs:
101,201
```

```
DHCP snooping is operational on following VLANs:
```

```
101,201
```

```
Insertion of option 82 is enabled
circuit-id default format: vlan-mod-port
remote-id: 682c.7bf8.8700 (MAC) <--- Leaf-01 adds the switch MAC to Option 82 to indicate to CGW
```

```
CGW#
```

```
show ip dhcp snooping
```

```
Switch DHCP snooping is enabled
```

```
Switch DHCP gleaning is disabled
DHCP snooping is configured on following VLANs:
101,201
```


```
DHCP snooping is operational on following VLANs:
```

```
101,201
```

## 配置 ( 部分隔离保护 )

接入枝叶上的DHCP监听依靠来自CGW的默认网关路由来获取用于将DHCP数据包转发到的网关MAC。


- 使用带有外部网关的部分隔离设计时，在CGW上需要额外的配置才能使用默认网关(DEF GW)属性通告MAC-IP RT2。




注：注：此部分还用于描述完全隔离受保护网段实施，该实施还使用通告到交换矩阵中的GW（与交换矩阵外部的GW）。

---

网络图





## L2 VTEP ( 枝叶 ) 密钥详细信息

请求数据包来自客户端

- 使用Default gw advertised CGW mac。
- 如果存在多个gw，则使用第一个gw mac。
- 将外部广播MAC ( 客户端发起：DORA中的D和R ) 转换为单播GW MAC并转发到CGW

DHCP监听添加：选项82子选项：电路和RID

( RID由CGW上的响应数据包处理使用 )。

(通知CGW其非本地和交换矩阵中继返回L2VTEP)

<#root>

Option: (82) Agent Information Option  
Length: 24



```
Option 82 Suboption: (1) Agent Circuit ID
  Length: 12
  Agent Circuit ID: 010a00080000277501010000
```

```
Option 82 Suboption: (2) Agent Remote ID
  Length: 8
  Agent Remote ID:
  000
```

```
682c7bf88700 <-- switch base mac 682c.7bf8.8700 (from 'show switch')
```

- 通过vxlan隧道从CGW接收的响应数据包。
- Leaf Strips选项82。
- 添加带有客户端源接口的绑定条目。（ vxlan-mod-port提供客户端源接口 ）。
- 转发到客户端的响应数据包。


### L3 VTEP (CGW)密钥详细信息

- 启用DHCP监听
- 在SVI中启用DHCP中继
- 从L2VTEP接收请求，并将其提供给中继。
- 中继添加其他选项82子选项（ gi、服务器覆盖等 ）并发送到DHCP服务器。
- 来自dhcp服务器的DHCP响应首先进入RELAY组件。
- 在RELAY删除选项82参数（ gi地址、服务器覆盖等 ）后，数据包将传递到dhcp监听组件。
- 监听组件检查RID（ 路由器ID ），如果它不是本地路由器，则不会删除选项82子选项1和2。
- 交换矩阵中继（ 因为RID不是本地的 ）数据包直接转发到远程客户端。
- 使用客户端Mac并执行网桥插入。 硬件执行客户端mac查找，并将具有vxlan封装的数据包转发到始发L2VTEP。

支持DHCP L2中继所需的步骤：

1. 启用ip local learning
2. 创建禁用收集功能的策略
3. 连接到外部网关EVI/VLAN
4. 将静态条目添加到外部网关mac-ip的设备跟踪表中
5. 创建BGP路由映射以匹配RT2 MAC-IP前缀并设置默认网关扩展社区

6. 将路由映射应用到BGP路由反射器邻居
  7. 确保DHCP中继的配置正确以处理其他选项
  8. 在交换矩阵VLAN和外部GW VLAN上配置DHCP监听
- 



注意：无需在接入枝叶上进行配置更改即可支持带有外部网关的DHCP L2中继。

---

CGW

启用ip local learning

<#root>

CGW#

```
show running-config | beg l2vpn evpn instance 202
```

```
l2vpn evpn instance 202 vlan-based
```

```
encapsulation vxlan
replication-type ingress

ip local-learning enable
```

<-- to advertise RT-2 with default gateway EC, ip local-learning must be enabled on the CGW.

Use additional device-tracking policy shown in the next output to prevent MAC-IP binding flapping with  
multicast advertise enable

<--- There is no default-gateway advertise enable cli here, as the SVI (Vlan 2021) used by this segment

## 创建禁用收集功能的策略

```
<#root>
```

```
device-tracking policy dt-no-glean <-- Configure device tracking policy to prevent MAC-IP flapping

security-level glean
no protocol ndp
no protocol dhcp6
no protocol arp
no protocol dhcp4
```

## 连接到外部网关evpn/vlan

```
<#root>
```

```
CGW#

show running-config | sec vlan config

vlan configuration 202
member evpn-instance 202 vni 20201

device-tracking attach-policy dt-no-glean <-- apply the new device tracking policy to the vlan configuration
```

## 将静态条目添加到外部网关mac-ip的设备跟踪表中

```
<#root>
```

```
device-tracking binding vlan 202 10.1.202.1 interface TwentyFiveGigE1/0/1 0000.beef.cafe

<-- All static entries in device tracking table should be for external gateway mac-ip's.
```

If there is any other static entry in device tracking table, match ip/ipv6 configurations in route m

## 创建BGP路由映射以匹配RT2 MAC-IP前缀并设置默认网关扩展社区

```
<#root>
route-map CGW_DEF_GW permit 10
  match evpn route-type 2-mac-ip <-- match RT2 type MAC-IP

  set extcommunity default-gw <-- Set Default-gateway (DEF GW 0:0) extended community

route-map CGW_DEF_GW permit 20
```

## 将路由映射应用到BGP路由反射器邻居

```
<#root>
CGW#
sh run | sec router bgp

address-family l2vpn evpn
  neighbor 172.16.255.1 activate
  neighbor 172.16.255.1 send-community both
  neighbor 172.16.255.1

route-map CGW_DEF_GW out <-- Sets the DEF GW Community when it advertises MAC-IP type RT2 to the RR

  neighbor 172.16.255.2 activate
  neighbor 172.16.255.2 send-community both
  neighbor 172.16.255.2

route-map CGW_DEF_GW out <-- Sets the DEF GW Community when it advertises MAC-IP type RT2 to the RR
```

## 确保DHCP中继的配置正确以处理其他选项

```
<#root>
CGW#
show run int vl 2021
Building configuration...
Current configuration : 315 bytes
!
interface Vlan2021
  mac-address 0000.beef.cafe
```

```

vrf forwarding pink

ip dhcp relay information option vpn-id <-- Ensure the vrf info is passed to the server
ip dhcp relay source-interface Loopback0 <-- sets the relay source interface to the loopback

ip address 10.1.202.1 255.255.255.0

ip helper-address global 10.1.33.33 <-- In this scenario the next hop to the DHCP server is in th

no ip redirects
ip local-proxy-arp
ip route-cache same-interface
no autostate

```

## 在交换矩阵VLAN和外部GW VLAN上配置DHCP监听

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf01#
```

```
sh run | s dhcp snoop
```

```
ip dhcp snooping vlan 202
ip dhcp snooping
```

```
CGW#
```

```
sh run | s dhcp snoop
```

```
ip dhcp snooping vlan 202,2021 <-- snooping is required in both the fabric vlan and the external GW vla
ip dhcp snooping
```

## 确保到DHCP服务器的上行链路在CGW上受信任

```
<#root>
```

```
CGW#
```

```
sh run int tw 1/0/1
```

```
interface TwentyFiveGigE1/0/1
switchport trunk allowed vlan 202
switchport mode trunk
```

```
ip dhcp snooping trust
```

```
end
```


```
CGW#
```

```
sh run int tw 1/0/2
```

```
interface TwentyFiveGigE1/0/2
switchport trunk allowed vlan 33,2021
switchport mode trunk
```

```
ip dhcp snooping trust
end
```

---



注意：由于服务器在防火墙设备上的放置方式，因此两个面向此设备的链路上都配置了信任。在放大图中，您可以看到此设计中的Offer同时到达Tw1/0/1和Tw1/0/2。

---

## 验证（部分隔离保护）

网关前缀（枝叶）

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf01#
```

```
show bgp l2vpn evpn route-type 2 0 0000.beef.cafe 10.1.202.1
```

```

BGP routing table entry for [2][172.16.254.3:202][0][48][0000BEEFCAFE][32][10.1.202.1]/24, version 3411
Paths: (1 available, best #1, table evi_202)
  Not advertised to any peer
  Refresh Epoch 2
  Local, imported path from [2][172.16.254.6:202][0][48][0000BEEFCAFE][32][10.1.202.1]/24 (global)
    172.16.254.6 (metric 3) (via default) from 172.16.255.1 (172.16.255.1)
    Origin incomplete, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, internal, best
    EVPN ESI: 00000000000000000000, Label 20201
    Extended Community: RT:65001:202 ENCAP:8

```

```

EVPN DEF GW:0:0      <-- GW attribute added indicating this is GW prefix which L2 Relay uses

Originator: 172.16.255.6, Cluster list: 172.16.255.1
rx pathid: 0, tx pathid: 0x0
Updated on Sep 19 2023 19:57:25 UTC

```

## FED MATM ( 枝叶 )

确认枝叶已在硬件中安装CGW远程MAC

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf01#
```

```
show platform software fed switch active matm macTable vlan 202
```

VLAN	MAC	Type	Seq#	EC_Bi	Flags	machandle	siHandle	riHandle
202	0006.f601.cd01	0x1	1093	0	0	0x71e05918f138	0x71e05917a1a8	0x0
202	0006.f601.cd44	0x1	14309	0	0	0x71e058cdc208	0x71e05917a1a8	0x0

```
202
```

```
0000.beef.cafe 0x5000001
```

```
0 0 64 0x71e058ee5d88 0x71e059195f88 0x71e059171678 0x0
```

```
<--- The GW MAC shows learnt via the Border Leaf Loopback
```

```
Total Mac number of addresses:: 3
```

```
Summary:
```

```
Total number of secure addresses:: 0
```

```
Total number of drop addresses:: 0
```

```
Total number of lisp local addresses:: 0
```

```
Total number of lisp remote addresses:: 1
```

```
*a_time=aging_time(secs) *e_time=total_elapsed_time(secs)
```

```
Type:
```

```
MAT_DYNAMIC_ADDR 0x1
```

MAT_STATIC_ADDR	0x2	MAT_CPU_ADDR	0x4	MAT_DISCARD_ADDR	0x8
MAT_ALL_VLANS	0x10	MAT_NO_FORWARD	0x20	MAT_IPMULT_ADDR	0x40
MAT_DO_NOT_AGE	0x100	MAT_SECURE_ADDR	0x200	MAT_NO_PORT	0x400
MAT_DUP_ADDR	0x1000	MAT_NULL_DESTINATION	0x2000	MAT_DOT1X_ADDR	0x4000
MAT_WIRELESS_ADDR	0x10000	MAT_SECURE_CFG_ADDR	0x20000	MAT_OPQ_DATA_PRESENT	0x40000
MAT_DLR_ADDR	0x100000	MAT_MRP_ADDR	0x200000	MAT_MSRRP_ADDR	0x400000

```
MAT_LISP_REMOTE_ADDR 0x1000000
```

```
MAT_VPLS_ADDR
```

```
0x2000000 MAT_LISP_GW_ADDR 0x4000000
```

```
<-- these 3 values added = 0x5000001 (note that 0x4000000 = GW type address
```

## 本地MAC ( 枝叶 )

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf01#
```

```
show switch
```

```
Switch/Stack Mac Address : 682c.7bf8.8700 - Local Mac Address
```

```
Mac persistency wait time: Indefinite
```

```
Switch#   Role   Mac Address           Priority Version   H/W   Current State
```

```
-----  
*1        Active
```

```
682c.7bf8.8700
```

```
1        V01    Ready
```

```
<-- this is the MAC that will be added to DHCP Agent Remote ID
```

## DHCP监听 ( 枝叶和CGW )

确认已在交换矩阵vlan中的枝叶上启用DHCP监听

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf01#
```

```
show ip dhcp snooping
```

```
Switch DHCP snooping is enabled
```

```
Switch DHCP gleaning is disabled
```

```
DHCP snooping is configured on following VLANs:
```

```
202
```

```
DHCP snooping is operational on following VLANs: <-- Snooping on in the Fabric Vlan
```

```
202
```

```
<...snip...>
```

```
Insertion of option 82 is enabled
```

```
  circuit-id default format: vlan-mod-port
```

```
  remote-id: 682c.7bf8.8700 (MAC)
```

```
<--- Remote ID (RID) inserted by Leaf to DHCP packets
```

```
<...snip...>
```



确认已在交换矩阵和外部网关vlan中的CGW上启用DHCP监听

<#root>

```
CGW#  
show ip dhcp snooping  
Switch DHCP snooping is enabled  
Switch DHCP gleaning is disabled  
DHCP snooping is configured on following VLANs:  
202,2021  
DHCP snooping is operational on following VLANs: <-- Snooping on in the Fabric and External GW Vlans  
202,2021  
<...snip...>
```

DHCP snooping trust/rate is configured on the following Interfaces:

Interface	Trusted	Allow option	Rate limit (pps)
TwentyFiveGigE1/0/1	yes	yes	unlimited

<-- Trust set on ports the OFFER arrives on

Interface	Trusted	Allow option	Rate limit (pps)
TwentyFiveGigE1/0/2	yes	yes	unlimited

<-- Trust set on ports the OFFER arrives on

Custom circuit-ids:

确认已创建DHCP监听绑定

<#root>

```
Leaf01#  
show ip dhcp snooping binding
```

MacAddress

IpAddress

Lease(sec) Type VLAN

Interface

-----

00:06:F6:01:CD:43

10.1.202.10

34261 dhcp-snooping 202


GigabitEthernet1/0/1 <-- DHCP Snooping has created the binding

Total number of bindings: 1

## 故障排除 (任何CGW类型)

调试有助于显示DHCP监听和L2中继进程如何处理DHCP数据包。

---



注意：这些调试可用于任何类型的使用带DHCP L2中继的CGW的部署。

---

## DHCP监听调试 (枝叶)

## 调试监听以确认数据包处理

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf01#
```

```
debug ip dhcp snooping packet
```

```
DHCP Snooping Packet debugging is on
```

```
Leaf01#
```

```
show debugging
```

```
DHCP Snooping packet debugging is on
```

## 开始主机DHCP地址尝试

- 对于本文档，执行通过DHCP寻址的SVI的关闭/不关闭以触发DORA交换
- 对于Windows主机，可以执行ipconfig /release > ipconfig /renew

## 从show logging或终端窗口收集调试

### DHCP 发现

#### 发现来自面向主机的端口

```
<#root>
```

```
*Sep 19 20:16:31.164:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (GigabitEthernet1/0/1) <-- host facing port
```

```
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPDISCOVER, input interface: Gi1/0/1
```

```
, MAC da: ffff.ffff.ffff,
```

```
MAC sa: 0006.f601.cd43
```

```
, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 0.0.0.0, DHCP ciaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP yiaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP siaddr: 0.0.0.0
```

```
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177: DHCP_SNOOPING: add relay information option.
```

```
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: Encoding opt82 CID in vlan-mod-port format <-- Option 82 encoding
```

```
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177: DHCP_SNOOPING:VxLAN : vlan_id 202 VNI 20201 mod 1 port 1
```

```
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: Encoding opt82 RID in MAC address format <-- Encoding the switch Remote ID (local)
```

```
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of relay info option, length: 26 data:
```

```
0x52 0x18 0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6
```

```
0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8 0x87 0x0 <-- the switch local MAC 682c.7bf8.8700
```

```
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177: DHCP BRIDGE PAK: vlan=202 platform_flags=1
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177: DHCP_SNOOPING: bridge packet get invalid mat entry: FFFF.FFFF.FFFF, packet is flo
*Sep 19 20:16:31.177:
DHCP_SNOOPING: L2RELAY: sent unicast packet to default gw: 0000.beef.cafe vlan 0 src intf GigabitEthernet
```

## DHCP 提供

发现优惠从交换矩阵隧道接口到达

<#root>

```
*Sep 19 20:16:33.180:
DHCP_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (Tunnel0)
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194:
DHCP_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPPOFFER, input interface: Tu0, MAC da: 0006.f601
, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 10.1.202.1, DHCP ciaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP yiaddr: 10.1.202.18, DHCP siaddr
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of option 82, length: 26 data:
0x52 0x18 0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted circuit id, length: 14 data:
0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted remote id, length: 10 data:
0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6
0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8 0x87 0x0 <-- the switch local MAC 682c.7bf8.8700
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: actual_fmt_cid OPT82_FMT_CID_VXLAN_MOD_PORT_INTF global_opt82_fmt_rid OPT82_FMT_
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: dhcp_snooping_platform_is_local_dhcp_packet: VXLAN-MOD-PORT opt82 vni 20201, vlan
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194:
DHCP_SNOOPING: opt82 data indicates local packet <-- switch found its own RID in Option 82 paramete
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING: remove relay information option.
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING opt82_fmt_cid_intf OPT82_FMT_CID_VXLAN_MOD_PORT_INTF opt82_fmt_cid_
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194:
DHCP_SNOOPING: VxLAN vlan_id 202 VNI 20201 mod 1 port 1
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194:
DHCP_SNOOPING: mod 1 port 1 idb Gi1/0/1 found for 0006.f601.cd43
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING: calling forward_dhcp_reply
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: platform lookup dest vlan for input_if: Tunnel0, is tunnel, if_output: NULL, if_
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING opt82_fmt_cid_intf OPT82_FMT_CID_VXLAN_MOD_PORT_INTF opt82_fmt_cid_
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING: VxLAN vlan_id 202 VNI 20201 mod 1 port 1
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING: mod 1 port 1 idb Gi1/0/1 found for 0006.f601.cd43
*Sep 19 20:16:33.194: DHCP_SNOOPING: vlan 202 after pvlan check
*Sep 19 20:16:33.207:
DHCP_SNOOPING: direct forward dhcp reply to output port: GigabitEthernet1/0/1. <-- sending packet to hos
```

## DHCP 请求

从面向主机的端口看到请求

<#root>

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.209:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (GigabitEthernet1/0/1)

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPREQUEST

, input interface: Gi1/0/1, MAC da: ffff.ffff.ffff, MAC sa: 0006.f601.cd43, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222: DHCP\_SNOOPING: add relay information option.

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222: DHCP\_SNOOPING: Encoding opt82 CID in vlan-mod-port format

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222: DHCP\_SNOOPING:VxLAN : vlan\_id 202 VNI 20201 mod 1 port 1

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222: DHCP\_SNOOPING: Encoding opt82 RID in MAC address format

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of relay info option, length: 26 data:

0x52 0x18 0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222: DHCP\_S BRIDGE PAK: vlan=202 platform\_flags=1

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222: DHCP\_SNOOPING: bridge packet get invalid mat entry: FFFF.FFFF.FFFF, packet is flo

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.222:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: L2RELAY: sent unicast packet to default gw: 0000.beef.cafe vlan 0 src intf GigabitEthernet

## DHCP确认

发现确认从交换矩阵隧道接口到达

<#root>

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.225:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (Tunnel0)

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.238:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPACK, input interface: Tu0, MAC da: 0006.f601.c

, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 10.1.202.1, DHCP ciaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP yiaddr: 10.1.202.10, DHCP siaddr

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.238: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of option 82, length: 26 data:

0x52 0x18 0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted circuit id, length: 14 data:

0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted remote id, length: 10 data:

0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8 0x87 0x0

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: actual\_fmt\_cid OPT82\_FMT\_CID\_VXLAN\_MOD\_PORT\_INTF global\_opt82\_fmt\_rid OPT82\_FMT\_

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: dhcp\_snooping\_platform\_is\_local\_dhcp\_packet: VXLAN-MOD-PORT opt82 vni 20201, vlan

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: opt82 data indicates local packet

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239:

dhcp\_snooping\_platform\_is\_local\_dhcp\_packet: VXLAN-MOD-PORT opt82 vni 20201, vlan\_id 202


\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: opt82 data indicates local packet  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING opt82\_fmt\_cid\_intf OPT82\_FMT\_CID\_VXLAN\_MOD\_PORT\_INTF opt82\_fmt\_cid\_  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: VxLAN vlan\_id 202 VNI 20201 mod 1 port 1  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: mod 1 port 1 idb Gi1/0/1 found for 0006.f601.cd43

\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: Reroute dhcp pak, message type: DHCPACK  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: remove relay information option.  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING opt82\_fmt\_cid\_intf OPT82\_FMT\_CID\_VXLAN\_MOD\_PORT\_INTF opt82\_fmt\_cid\_  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: VxLAN vlan\_id 202 VNI 20201 mod 1 port 1  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: mod 1 port 1 idb Gi1/0/1 found for 0006.f601.cd43  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: calling forward\_dhcp\_reply  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: platform lookup dest vlan for input\_if: Tunnel0, is tunnel, if\_output: NULL, if\_  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING opt82\_fmt\_cid\_intf OPT82\_FMT\_CID\_VXLAN\_MOD\_PORT\_INTF opt82\_fmt\_cid\_  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: VxLAN vlan\_id 202 VNI 20201 mod 1 port 1  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: mod 1 port 1 idb Gi1/0/1 found for 0006.f601.cd43  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.239: DHCP\_SNOOPING: vlan 202 after pvlan check  
\*Sep 19 20:16:33.252:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: direct forward dhcp replyto output port: GigabitEthernet1/0/1.

---



---

注意：这些调试会被截取。它们会生成数据包的内存转储，但调试结果的此部分注释不在本文档的讨论范围之内。

---

## DHCP监听调试(CGW)

### DHCP 发现

由于数据包在CGW上发送和接收的方式（在防火墙上迂回），调试会触发两次

从隧道接口上的交换矩阵到达并从Tw 1/0/1发送到交换矩阵VLAN 202中的防火墙

<#root>

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.890:

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (Tunnel0) <-- Discover sent from Leaf01 a
```

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.901: DHCP\_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPDISCOVER, input interfa

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.901: DHCP\_S BRIDGE PAK: vlan=202 platform\_flags=1

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.901:

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: bridge packet send packet to port: TwentyFiveGigE1/0/1, pak_vlan 202. <-- Sent to Firewal
```

从Vlan 2021中Tw 1/0/2上的防火墙到达，将发送到SVI和帮助程序到DHCP服务器

<#root>

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.901:

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (TwentyFiveGigE1/0/2) <-- Firewall sends di
```

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.911: DHCP\_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPDISCOVER, input interfa

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.911:

```
DHCP_S BRIDGE PAK: vlan=2021 platform_flags=1 <-- Vlan discover seen is now 2021
```

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.911:

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: Packet destined to SVI Mac:0000.beef.cafe
```

\*Apr 16 14:37:43.911:

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: bridge packet send packet to cpu port: Vlan2021. <-- Packet punted to CPU for handling k
```

### DHCP 提供

从DHCP服务器返回SVI 2021，在此配置帮助程序并将其转发到防火墙

```
<#root>
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.913:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (Vlan2021) <-- Arriving from the DHCP serv
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.923:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPPOFFER, input interface: Vl2021
```

```
, MAC da: ffff.ffff.ffff, MAC sa: 0000.beef.cafe, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 10.1.202.1, DHCP ciadd
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.923: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of option 82, length: 26 data:
```

```
0x52 0x18 0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted circuit id, length: 14 data:
```

```
0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted remote id, length: 10 data:
```

```
0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8 0x87 0x0
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924: actual_fmt_cid OPT82_FMT_CID_VXLAN_MOD_PORT_INTF global_opt82_fmt_rid OPT82_FMT_R
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924: dhcp_snooping_platform_is_local_dhcp_packet: VXLAN-MOD-PORT opt82 vni 20201, vlan
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: opt82 data indicates not a local packet
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924: DHCP_SNOOPING: can't parse option 82 data of the message,it is either in wrong fo
```

```
<-- This is expected even in working scenario (disregard it)
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924: DHCP_SNOOPING: calling forward_dhcp_reply
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924: platform lookup dest vlan for input_if: Vlan2021, is NOT tunnel, if_output: Vlan2
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.924: DHCP_SNOOPING: vlan 2021 after pvlan check
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.934:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: direct forward dhcp reply to output port: TwentyFiveGigE1/0/2. <-- sending back toward the
```

从交换矩阵VLAN中的防火墙到达，并从CGW发送到交换矩阵到枝叶

```
<#root>
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.934:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (TwentyFiveGigE1/0/1)
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.944:
```

```
DHCP_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPPOFFER, input interface: Twe1/0/1
```

```
, MAC da: ffff.ffff.ffff, MAC sa: 0000.beef.cafe, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 10.1.202.1, DHCP ciadd
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.944: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of option 82, length: 26 data:
```

```
0x52 0x18 0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.944: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted circuit id, length: 14 data:
```

```
0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0
```

```
*Apr 16 14:37:45.944: DHCP_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted remote id, length: 10 data:
```



0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8 0x87 0x0

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.944: actual\_fmt\_cid OPT82\_FMT\_CID\_VXLAN\_MOD\_PORT\_INTF global\_opt82\_fmt\_rid OPT82\_FMT\_R

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.944: dhcp\_snooping\_platform\_is\_local\_dhcp\_packet: VXLAN-MOD-PORT opt82 vni 20201, vlan

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.945:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: opt82 data indicates not a local packet

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.945: DHCP\_SNOOPING: EVPN enabled Ex GW:fabric relay can't parse option 82 data of the r

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.945: DHCP\_SNOOPING: client address lookup failed to locate client interface, retry loo

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.945: DHCP\_SNOOPING: lookup packet destination port failed to get mat entry for mac: 00

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.945:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: L2RELAY: Ex GW unicast bridge packet to fabric: vlan id 202 from Twe1/0/1 <-- L2 RELAY f

## DHCP 请求

<#root>

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.967:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (Tunnel0)

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.978:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPREQUEST

, input interface: Tu0, MAC da: 0000.beef.cafe, MAC sa: 0006.f601.cd43, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 0

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.978: DHCP BRIDGE PAK: vlan=202 platform\_flags=1

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.978:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: bridge packet send packet to port: TwentyFiveGigE1/0/1, pak\_vlan 202. <-- Send toward Fir

<#root>

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.978:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (TwentyFiveGigE1/0/2) <-- Receive from Fire

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.989:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPREQUEST

, input interface: Twe1/0/2, MAC da: 0000.beef.cafe, MAC sa: 0006.f601.cd43, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.989: DHCP BRIDGE PAK: vlan=2021 platform\_flags=1

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.989: DHCP\_SNOOPING: Packet destined to SVI Mac:0000.beef.cafe

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.989:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: bridge packet send packet to cpu port: Vlan2021. <-- Punt to CPU / DHCP helper

## DHCP 确认

<#root>

\*Apr 16 14:37:45.990:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (Vlan2021) <-- Packet back to SVI from DHCP

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.000:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPACK, input interface: Vl2021

, MAC da: ffff.ffff.ffff, MAC sa: 0000.beef.cafe, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 10.1.202.1, DHCP ciaddr

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.000: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of option 82, length: 26 data:

0x52 0x18 0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.000: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted circuit id, length: 14 data:

0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.000: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted remote id, length: 10 data:

0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8 0x87 0x0

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.001: actual\_fmt\_cid OPT82\_FMT\_CID\_VXLAN\_MOD\_PORT\_INTF global\_opt82\_fmt\_rid OPT82\_FMT\_R

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.001: dhcp\_snooping\_platform\_is\_local\_dhcp\_packet: VXLAN-MOD-PORT opt82 vni 20201, vlan

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.001:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: opt82 data indicates not a local packet <-- found this is coming from Leaf01 RID

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.001: DHCP\_SNOOPING: can't parse option 82 data of the message, it is either in wrong fo

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.001: DHCP\_SNOOPING: calling forward\_dhcp\_reply

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.001: platform lookup dest vlan for input\_if: Vlan2021, is NOT tunnel, if\_output: Vlan2

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.001: DHCP\_SNOOPING: vlan 2021 after pvlan check

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.011:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: direct forward dhcp reply to output port: TwentyFiveGigE1/0/2. <-- Send to Firewall

<#root>

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.011:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (TwentyFiveGigE1/0/1) <-- Coming back in f

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPACK, input interface: Twel/0/1,

MAC da: ffff.ffff.ffff, MAC sa: 0000.beef.cafe, IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 10.1.202.1, DHCP ciaddr

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of option 82, length: 26 data:

0x52 0x18 0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0 0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted circuit id, length: 14 data:

0x1 0xC 0x1 0xA 0x0 0x8 0x0 0x0 0x4E 0xE9 0x1 0x1 0x0 0x0

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP\_SNOOPING: binary dump of extracted remote id, length: 10 data:

0x2 0x8 0x0 0x6 0x68 0x2C 0x7B 0xF8 0x87 0x0

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: actual\_fmt\_cid OPT82\_FMT\_CID\_VXLAN\_MOD\_PORT\_INTF global\_opt82\_fmt\_rid OPT82\_FMT\_R

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: dhcp\_snooping\_platform\_is\_local\_dhcp\_packet: VXLAN-MOD-PORT opt82 vni 20201, vlan

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022:

DHCP\_SNOOPING: opt82 data indicates not a local packet

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP\_SNOOPING: EVPN enabled Ex GW: fabric relay can't parse option 82 data of the r

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP\_SNOOPING: client address lookup failed to locate client interface, retry loo

\*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP\_SNOOPING: lookup packet destination port failed to get mat entry for mac: 00

```
*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP_SNOOPING: can't find client's destination port, packet is assumed to be not  
*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP_SNOOPING: client address lookup failed to locate client interface, retry loo  
*Apr 16 14:37:46.022: DHCP_SNOOPING: lookup packet destination port failed to get mat entry for mac: 00  
*Apr 16 14:37:46.022:  
DHCP_SNOOPING: L2RELAY: Ex GW unicast bridge packet to fabric: vlan id 202 from Twel/0/1 <-- Send packe
```

## 嵌入式捕获

### 使用EPC确认DHCP数据包交换和参数正确

- 这从CGW的角度显示，但可以在枝叶上重复此过程以验证数据包交换
- 此示例显示Discover，因为其他DHCP数据包的流程和分析相同

### 检查到枝叶环回的路由

```
<#root>
```

```
CGW#
```

```
show ip route 172.16.254.3
```

```
Routing entry for 172.16.254.3/32
```

```
Known via "ospf 1", distance 110, metric 3, type intra area
```

```
Last update from 172.16.1.25 on TwentyFiveGigE1/0/47, 2w6d ago
```

```
Routing Descriptor Blocks:
```

```
* 172.16.1.29, from 172.16.255.3, 2w6d ago,
```

```
via TwentyFiveGigE1/0/48
```

```
Route metric is 3, traffic share count is 1
```

```
172.16.1.25, from 172.16.255.3, 2w6d ago,
```

```
via TwentyFiveGigE1/0/47
```

```
Route metric is 3, traffic share count is 1
```

### 配置捕获以在面向Leaf01的链路上运行

```
monitor capture 1 interface TwentyFiveGigE1/0/47 BOTH  
monitor capture 1 interface TwentyFiveGigE1/0/48 BOTH  
monitor capture 1 match any  
monitor capture 1 buffer size 100  
monitor capture 1 limit pps 1000
```

### 开始捕获、触发主机请求DHCP IP地址以及停止捕获

```
<#root>
```

```
monitor capture 1 start
(have the host request dhcp ip)
monitor capture 1 stop
```

查看从DHCP发现开始的捕获结果 ( 注意事务ID以确认这是相同的DORA事件 )

```
<#root>
```

```
CGW#
```

```
show monitor cap 1 buff brief | i DHCP
```

```
16
```

```
12.737135      0.0.0.0 -> 255.255.255.255 DHCP 434
```

```
DHCP Discover
```

```
-
```

```
Transaction ID 0x78b <-- Discover starts at Frame 16 with all same transaction ID
```

```
18 14.740041 10.1.202.1 -> 255.255.255.255 DHCP 438 DHCP
```

```
Offer
```

```
- Transaction ID
```

```
0x78b
```

```
19 14.742741      0.0.0.0 -> 255.255.255.255 DHCP 452 DHCP
```

```
Request
```

```
- Transaction ID
```

```
0x78b
```

```
20 14.745646 10.1.202.1 -> 255.255.255.255 DHCP 438 DHCP
```

```
ACK
```

```
- Transaction ID
```

```
0x78b
```

```
<#root>
```

```
CGW#
```

```
sh mon cap 1 buff detailed | b Frame 16
```

```
Frame 16:
```

```
434 bytes on wire (3472 bits), 434 bytes captured (3472 bits) on interface /tmp/epc_ws/wif_to_ts_pipe,
[Protocols in frame: eth:ethertype:ip:udp:vxlan:eth:ethertype:ip:udp:dhcp]
Ethernet II,
Src: dc:77:4c:8a:6d:7f
```

```
(dc:77:4c:8a:6d:7f),
Dst: 10:f9:20:2e:9f:82
(10:f9:20:2e:9f:82)
<-- Underlay Interface MACs
Type: IPv4 (0x0800)
Internet Protocol Version 4,
Src: 172.16.254.3, Dst: 172.16.254.6
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 65281,
Dst Port: 4789 <-- VXLAN Port
Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
VXLAN Network Identifier
(VNI): 20201 <-- Correct VNI / Segment
Reserved: 0
Ethernet II,
Src: 00:06:f6:01:cd:43
(00:06:f6:01:cd:43),
Dst: 00:00:be:ef:ca:fe
(00:00:be:ef:ca:fe)
<-- Inner Packet destined to CGW MAC
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 0.0.0.0, Dst: 255.255.255.255
User Datagram Protocol,
Src Port: 68, Dst Port: 67 <-- DHCP ports
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (Discover) <-- DHCP Discover Packet
Client MAC address: 00:06:f6:01:cd:43
(00:06:f6:01:cd:43)
Client hardware address padding: 00000000000000000000
Server host name not given
Boot file name not given
Magic cookie: DHCP
Option: (53) DHCP Message Type (Discover)
Length: 1
DHCP: Discover (1)
Option: (57) Maximum DHCP Message Size
Length: 2
Maximum DHCP Message Size: 1152
Option: (61) Client identifier
Length: 27
Type: 0
Client Identifier: cisco-0006.f601.cd43-V1202
Option: (12) Host Name
```

Length: 17

Host Name: 9300-HOST-3750X-2

Option: (55) Parameter Request List

Length: 8

Parameter Request List Item: (1) Subnet Mask

Parameter Request List Item: (6) Domain Name Server

Parameter Request List Item: (15) Domain Name

Parameter Request List Item: (44) NetBIOS over TCP/IP Name Server

Parameter Request List Item: (3) Router

Parameter Request List Item: (33) Static Route

Parameter Request List Item: (150) TFTP Server Address

Parameter Request List Item: (43) Vendor-Specific Information

Option: (60) Vendor class identifier

Length: 8

Vendor class identifier: ciscopnp

Option: (82) Agent Information Option

Length: 24

Option 82 Suboption: (1) Agent Circuit ID

Length: 12

Agent Circuit ID: 010a000800004ee901010000

Option 82 Suboption: (2) Agent Remote ID

Length: 8

Agent Remote ID:

000

6682c7bf88700 <-- switch base mac 682c.7bf8.8700 (from 'show switch')

Option: (255) End

Option End: 255

---

注意：可在任何枝叶或CGW上使用捕获工具来确定怀疑部分DHCP DORA交换失败的最后一个点。

---

## 验证监听统计错误

```
<#root>
```

```
Leaf01#
```

```
show ip dhcp snooping statistics detail
```

```
  Packets Processed by DHCP Snooping                = 1288
```

```
Packets Dropped Because
```

```
  IDB not known                                     = 0
```

```
  Queue full                                       = 0
```

```
  Interface is in errdisabled                      = 0
```

```
  Rate limit exceeded                              = 0
```

```
  Received on untrusted ports                      = 0
```

```

Nonzero giaddr           = 0
Source mac not equal to chaddr = 0
No binding entry         = 0
Insertion of opt82 fail  = 0
Unknown packet          = 0
Interface Down           = 0
Unknown output interface = 0
Misdirected Packets     = 0
Packets with Invalid Size = 0
Packets with Invalid Option = 0

```

<-- Look for any drop counter that is actively incrementing when the issue is seen.

## 验证DHCP监听的传送路径

- CoPP是丢弃传送路径中的数据包的主要组件

<#root>

Leaf01#

```
show platform hardware switch active qos queue stats internal cpu policer
```

### CPU Queue Statistics

```

=====
                                         (default) (set)   Queue   Queue
QId
PlcIdx
  Queue Name           Enabled  Rate   Rate   Drop(Bytes)
Drop(Frames)
-----
17
6

```

### DHCP Snooping

```

      Yes    400    400    0
0

```

### CPU Queue Policer Statistics

```

=====
Policer
  Policer Accept  Policer Accept  Policer Drop  Policer Drop
Index
      Bytes      Frames      Bytes      Frames
-----

```



用于定位可能发生数据包泛洪位置的另一个非常有用的命令是“show platform software fed switch active punt rates interfaces”

- 这对于查找发生泛洪的源接口非常有用，因为泛洪会使传送路径拥塞并影响合法的CPU绑定流量

<#root>

Leaf01#

show platform software fed switch active punt rates interfaces

Punt Rate on Interfaces Statistics

Packets per second averaged over 10 seconds, 1 min and 5 mins

```
=====
                |          | Recv | Recv | Recv | Drop | Drop | Drop
<-- Receive and drop rates for this port
Interface Name    | IF_ID    | 10s  | 1min | 5min | 10s  | 1min | 5min
=====
```

Interface Name	IF_ID	10s	1min	5min	10s	1min	5min
GigabitEthernet1/0/1	0x0000000a	2	2	2	0	0	0

<-- the port and its IF-ID which can be used in the next command

-----

<#root>

Leaf01#

show platform software fed switch active punt rates interfaces 0xa <-- From previous command (omit the

Punt Rate on Single Interfaces Statistics

Interface : GigabitEthernet1/0/1 [if\_id: 0xA]

Received		Dropped	
-----		-----	
Total	: 8032546	Total	: 0
10 sec average	: 2	10 sec average	: 0
1 min average	: 2	1 min average	: 0
5 min average	: 2	5 min average	: 0

Per CPUQ punt stats on the interface

(rate averaged over 10s interval)

```

=====
Q | Queue | Recv | Recv | Drop | Drop |
no | Name | Total | Rate | Total | Rate |
=====
17
CPU_Q_DHCP_SNOOPING
1216 0 0 0
<...snip...>

```

## DHCP监听客户端统计信息

使用此命令观察DHCP消息交换。可以在枝叶或CGW上运行以查看事件跟踪

<#root>

Leaf01#

```
show platform dhcp snooping client stats 0006.F601.CD43
```

```

DHCP SN: DHCP snooping server
DHCPD: DHCP protocol daemen
L2FWD: Transmit Packet to driver in L2 format
FWD: Transmit Packet to driver

```

(B): Dhcp message's response expected as 'B'roadcast

(U): Dhcp message's response expected as 'U'nicast

Packet Trace for client MAC 0006.F601.CD43:

Timestamp	Destination MAC	Destination Ip	VLAN	Message	Handler:Action
2023/09/28 14:53:59.866	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPDISCOVER(B)	PUNT:RECEIVED
2023/09/28 14:53:59.866	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPDISCOVER(B)	PUNT:TO_DHCP SN
2023/09/28 14:53:59.867	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPDISCOVER(B)	BRIDGE:RECEIVED
2023/09/28 14:53:59.867	0000.BEEF.CAFE	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPDISCOVER(B)	L2INJECT:TO_FWD
2023/09/28 14:53:59.867	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPDISCOVER(B)	BRIDGE:TO_INJECT
2023/09/28 14:53:59.867	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPDISCOVER(B)	L2INJECT:TO_FWD
2023/09/28 14:54:01.871	0006.F601.CD43	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPOFFER(B)	PUNT:RECEIVED
2023/09/28 14:54:01.871	0006.F601.CD43	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPOFFER(B)	PUNT:TO_DHCP SN
2023/09/28 14:54:01.874	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPREQUEST(B)	PUNT:RECEIVED
2023/09/28 14:54:01.874	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPREQUEST(B)	PUNT:TO_DHCP SN
2023/09/28 14:54:01.874	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPREQUEST(B)	BRIDGE:RECEIVED
2023/09/28 14:54:01.874	0000.BEEF.CAFE	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPREQUEST(B)	L2INJECT:TO_FWD
2023/09/28 14:54:01.874	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPREQUEST(B)	BRIDGE:TO_INJECT
2023/09/28 14:54:01.874	FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPREQUEST(B)	L2INJECT:TO_FWD
2023/09/28 14:54:01.877	0006.F601.CD43	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPACK(B)	PUNT:RECEIVED
2023/09/28 14:54:01.877	0006.F601.CD43	255.255.255.255	202	DHCPACK(B)	PUNT:TO_DHCP SN

## 其他调试


```

debug ip dhcp server packet detail
debug ip dhcp server packet

```

```
debug ip dhcp server events
debug ip dhcp snooping packet
debug dhcp detail
```

---



警告：运行调试时务必小心！

---

## 相关信息

- [在Catalyst 9000系列交换机上实施BGP EVPN路由策略](#)
- [在Catalyst 9000系列交换机上实施BGP EVPN保护的重叠分段](#)
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