Usar depurações ASA IKEv2 para VPN site a site com PSKs

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Atualizado:4 de abril de 2024

ID do documento:115935

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Introdução

Este documento descreve informações sobre depurações de Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) no Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA).

Pré-requisitos

Requisitos

Não existem requisitos específicos para este documento.

Componentes Utilizados

Este documento não se restringe a versões de software e hardware específicas.

As informações neste documento foram criadas a partir de dispositivos em um ambiente de laboratório específico. Todos os dispositivos utilizados neste documento foram iniciados com uma configuração (padrão) inicial. Se a rede estiver ativa, certifique-se de que você entenda o impacto potencial de qualquer comando.

Problema principal

O processo de troca de pacotes usado em IKEv2 é radicalmente diferente do usado em IKEv1. Com o IKEv1, há uma troca de fase 1 claramente demarcada que consiste em seis pacotes e, em seguida, há uma troca de fase 2 que consiste em três pacotes. A troca de IKEv2 é variável.

Dica: para obter informações mais detalhadas sobre as diferenças e uma explicação do processo de troca de pacotes, consulte Intercâmbio de Pacotes IKEv2 e Depuração de Nível de Protocolo.

Depurações usadas

Estas duas depurações são usadas para IKEv2:

debug crypto ikev2 protocol 127
debug crypto ikev2 platform 127

Configurações do ASA

Esta seção fornece configurações de exemplo para ASA1 (o iniciador) e ASA2 (o respondente).

ASA1

interface GigabitEthernet0/0
nameif outside
security-level 0
ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
nameif inside 
security-level 100 
ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0 

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
protocol esp encryption aes-256
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
   host  192.168.2.99
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
   host 192.168.2.99 

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.2
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
crypto map outside_map interface outside

crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 86400

crypto ikev2 enable outside

tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

ASA2

interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
nameif outside 
security-level 0 
ip address 10.0.0.2 255.255.255.0

interface GigabitEthernet0/2
nameif inside
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0

crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
protocol esp encryption aes-256 
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5

access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 192.168.1.1 
access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
   host 192.168.1.12

crypto map outside_map 1 match address l2l_list
crypto map outside_map 1 set peer 10.0.0.1 
crypto map outside_map 1 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 
crypto map outside_map interface outside 

crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-256
integrity sha
group 2
prf sha
lifetime seconds 86400 

crypto ikev2 enable outside 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l 
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Debugs

Esta seção descreve as depurações do ASA1 (iniciador) e a negociação de túnel do ASA2 (respondente) e as descrições de mensagens e as depurações da Associação de Segurança (SA) filho.

Negociação de túnel

O ASA1 recebe um pacote que corresponde à lista de controle de acesso (ACL) criptografada para o ASA 10.0.0.2 peer e inicia a criação do SA:

IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel 
     group for IP: 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.2 
     using peer IP
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tp_name set to:
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
  IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
  IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing outgoing negotiating 
   sa count by one

O par inicial de mensagens enviadas é para a troca IKE_SA_INIT. Essas mensagens negociam os algoritmos criptográficos, trocam momentos e executam uma troca Diffie-Hellman (DH).

Aqui está a configuração relevante para o ASA1:

crypto ikev2 policy 1
  encryption aes-256
  integrity sha
  group 2
  prf sha
  lifetime seconds 86400
crypto ikev2 enable outside
  
Tunnel Group matching the identity name is present:
  
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.2 ipsec-attributes
  ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
  ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Esta é a saída de depuração para esta troca:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE Event: EV_INIT_SA
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 
     (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_SET_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI 
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958

O ASA1 cria o pacote IKE_INIT_SA, que contém:

Cabeçalho ISAKMP (SPI/version/flags)
SAi1 (algoritmo criptográfico suportado pelo iniciador IKE)
KEi (valor de chave pública DH do iniciador)
N (Iniciador Nonce)

R_SPI=0000000000000000 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: I_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG 
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     r: 0000000000000000]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 0000000000000000
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
     flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
  SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, 
     SPI size: 0, #trans: 4 
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
     id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 136
      DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
        19 65 43 45 d2 72 a7 11 b8 a4 93 3f 44 95 6c b8
       6d 5a f0 f8 1f f3 d4 b9 ff 41 7b 0d 13 90 82 cf
       34 2e 74 e3 03 6e 9e 00 88 80 5d 86 2c 4c 79 35
       ee e6 98 91 89 f3 48 83 75 09 02 f1 3c b1 7f f5
       be 05 f1 fa 7e 8a 4c 43 eb a9 2c 3a 47 c0 68 40
       f5 dd 02 9d a5 b5 a2 a6 90 64 95 fc 57 b5 69 e8
       b2 4f 8e f2 a5 05 e3 c7 17 f9 c0 e0 c8 3e 91 ed
       c1 09 23 3e e5 09 4f be 1a 6a d4 d9 fb 65 44 1d
  N  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
       84 8b 80 c2 52 6c 4f c7 f8 08 b8 ed! 52 af a2 f4
       d5 dd d4 f4
  VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 23
  
       43 49 53 43 4f 2d 44 45 4c 45 54 45 2d 52 45 41
       53 4f 4e
  VID  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 59
  
       43 49 53 43 4f 28 43 4f 50 59 52 49 47 48 54 29
       26 43 6f 70 79 72 69 67 68 74 20 28 63 29 20 32
       30 30 39 20 43 69 73 63 6f 20 53 79 73 74 65 6d
       73 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e
VID  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
     40 48 b7 6e bc e8 85 25 e7 de 7f 00 d6 c2 d3

O pacote IKE_INIT_SA é enviado pelo ASA1:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT]
     [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500

O ASA2 recebe o pacote IKEV_INIT_SA:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_SA_INIT]
      [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500
      InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x0000000000000000
    MID=00000000

O ASA2 inicia a criação do SA para esse peer:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
     10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     r: 0000000000000000]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 0000000000000000
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
     flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
  IKEv2-PLAT-5: New ikev2 sa request admitted
  IKEv2-PLAT-5: Incrementing incoming negotiating 
     sa count by one
  SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
     id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
      DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: IDLE 
     Event: EV_RECV_INIT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
   SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R)

O ASA2 verifica e processa a mensagem IKE_INIT:

Ele escolhe o conjunto de criptografia dentre os oferecidos pelo ASA1.
Ele computa sua própria chave secreta DH.
Ele também calcula um valor SKEYID, a partir do qual todas as chaves podem ser derivadas para esse IKE_SA. Todos, exceto os cabeçalhos de todas as mensagens que vêm em seguida, são criptografados e autenticados. As chaves usadas para a criptografia e a proteção de integridade são derivadas do SKEYID e são conhecidas como:
- SK_e é usado para criptografia.
- SK_a é usado para autenticação.
- SK_d é derivada e usada para derivação de outros materiais de chaveamento para CHILD_SAs. Uma SK_e e uma SK_a separadas são calculadas para cada direção.

Esta é a configuração relevante para o ASA2:

crypto ikev2 policy 1
  encryption aes-256
  integrity sha
  group 2
  prf sha
  lifetime seconds 86400
crypto ikev2 enable outside
  
Tunnel Group matching the identity name is present:
  
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 10.0.0.1 ipsec-attributes
  ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
  ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****

Aqui está a saída da depuração:

MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event: EV_INSERT_SA
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Insert SA
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
     Event: EV_GET_IKE_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT Event:EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
     Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): No NAT found
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_SET_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4PKI
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT  
     Event: EV_PKI_SESH_OPEN
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Opening a PKI session
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GEN_DH_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH public key
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_PUBKEY_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: R_BLD_INIT 
     Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000000 
   CurState: R_BLD_INIT Event: EV_BLD_MSG

O ASA2 cria a mensagem do respondente para a troca IKE_SA_INIT, que é recebida pelo ASA1. Este pacote contém:

Cabeçalho ISAKMP (SPI/ versão/flags)
SAr1 (algoritmo criptográfico escolhido pelo respondedor IKE)
KEr (valor de chave pública DH do respondente)
Responder Nonce

Aqui está a saída da depuração:

IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-3:   IKE Proposal: 1, SPI size: 0 
     (initial negotiation),
  Num. transforms: 4
  AES-CBC SHA1 SHA96 DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
     FRAGMENTATIONIKEv2-PROTO-3: 
     Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] m_id: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
  SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
     id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  
  KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
  
DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0

ASA2 envia a mensagem do respondente para ASA1:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
   RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 MID=00000000

ASA1 recebe o pacote de resposta IKE_SA_INIT do ASA2:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT 
     [IKE_SA_INIT] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->
     [10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
     RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000000

O ASA2 inicia o temporizador para o processo de autorização:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE 
     Event: EV_DONE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): 
     Fragmentation is
     enabled
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco 
     DeleteReason Notify 
     is enabled
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete 
     SA init exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE 
     Event: EV_CHK4_ROLE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000
  
  CurState: INIT_DONE Event: 
     EV_START_TMR
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Starting 
     timer to wait for auth 
     message (30 sec)
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT

O ASA1 verifica e processa a resposta:

A chave secreta DH do iniciador é computada.
O SKEYID do iniciador é gerado.

Aqui está a saída da depuração:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x0
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: SA, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_SA_INIT, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x0, length: 338
  
  SA  Next payload: KE, reserved: 0x0, length: 48
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: IKE, SPI size: 0, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 2, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA1
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 4, reserved: 0x0, 
     id: DH_GROUP_1024_MODP/Group 2
  KE  Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 136
      DH group: 2, Reserved: 0x0
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_WAIT_INIT 
     Event: EV_RECV_INIT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Processing initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify SA init message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing initial message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_DETECT_NAT
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Process NAT discovery notify
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): NAT-T is disabled
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_PROC_INIT 
     Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_DH_SECRET
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Computing DH secret key
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_OK_RECD_DH_SECRET_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000000 
     CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_GEN_SKEYID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate skeyid
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: INIT_DONE Event: EV_DONE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Fragmentation is enabled
IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Cisco DeleteReason Notify is enabled

A troca IKE_INIT_SA entre os ASAs agora está concluída:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Complete SA init exchange

ASA1 inicia a troca IKE_AUTH e começa a gerar o payload de autenticação. O pacote IKE_AUTH contém:

Cabeçalho ISAKMP (SPI/ versão/flags)
IDi (identidade do iniciador)
payload de AUTH
SAi2 (inicia o SA - semelhante à troca do conjunto de transformação da fase 2 em IKEv1)
TSi e TSr (seletores de tráfego do iniciador e do respondente)

Observação: o TSi e o TSr contêm os endereços de origem e destino do iniciador e do respondente, respectivamente, para encaminhar/receber tráfego criptografado. O intervalo de endereços especifica que todo o tráfego de e para esse intervalo é encapsulado. Se a proposta for aceitável para o respondente, ele retornará cargas TS idênticas.

Além disso, o primeiro CHILD_SA é criado para o par proxy_ID que corresponde ao pacote de acionamento.

Aqui está a configuração relevante para o ASA1:

crypto ipsec 
     ikev2 
     ipsec-proposal 
     AES256
  protocol esp 
     encryption 
     aes-256
  protocol esp 
     integrity 
     sha-1 md5
  
  access-list 
     l2l_list 
     extended 
     permit ip 
     host 10.0.0.2 
   host 10.0.0.1

Aqui está a saída da depuração:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
     key len 5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000000 CurState: I_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
     CISCO-GRANITE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
     (IPSec negotiation),
  Num. transforms: 4
     AES-CBC   SHA96   MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: INITIAL_CONTACT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Building packet for encryption; 
     contents are:
  VID  Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
  
       dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
  IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
      Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
  
       47 01 01 01
  AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
      Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
  Auth data&colon; 20 bytes
  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
    TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
      Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
  TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
      Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x1
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
  ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 256
Encrypted data&colon; 252 bytes

ASA1 envia o pacote IKE_AUTH para ASA2:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
     [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

O ASA2 recebe este pacote do ASA1:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
     [10.0.0.1]:500->[10.0.0.2]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

O ASA2 para o temporizador de autorização e verifica os dados de autenticação que são recebidos do ASA1. Em seguida, ele gera seus próprios dados de autenticação, exatamente como o ASA1.

Esta é a configuração relevante para o ASA2:

crypto ipsec 
     ikev2 
     ipsec-
     proposal 
     AES256
  protocol esp 
     encryption 
     aes-256
  protocol esp 
     integrity 
   sha-1 md5

Aqui está a saída da depuração:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x1
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 284
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Request has mess_id 1; 
     expected 1 through 1 REAL Decrypted packet:
     Data&colon; 216 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
     Next payload: IDi, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
  
       dd a3 b4 83 b7 01 6a 1f 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
  IDi  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
      Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
  
       47 01 01 01
  AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
      Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
  Auth data&colon; 20 bytes
  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
      Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
  TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
      Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Stopping timer to wait for auth 
     message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_NAT_T
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check NAT discovery
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_ID
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Recieved valid parameteres in 
     process id
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_FOR_
     PROF_SEL
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group for 
     ID: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 using 
     phase 1 ID
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_SET_POLICY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Setting configured policies
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH4EAP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_WAIT_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_POLREQEAP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.1, 
     key len 5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_GET_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PLAT-2: Build config mode reply: no request stored
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK4_IC
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Processing initial contact
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_REDIRECT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Redirect check is not needed, 
     skipping it
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer is accepted
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
     outside_map seq 1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_VERIFY_AUTH 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message

O ASA2 envia o pacote IKE_AUTH, que contém:

Cabeçalho ISAKMP (SPI/ versão/flags)
IDr. (identidade do respondente)
payload de AUTH
SAr2 (inicia o SA - semelhante à troca do conjunto de transformação da fase 2 em IKEv1)
TSi e TSr (seletores de tráfego do iniciador e do respondente)

Observação: o TSi e o TSr contêm os endereços de origem e destino do iniciador e do respondente, respectivamente, para encaminhar/receber tráfego criptografado. O intervalo de endereços especifica que todo o tráfego de e para esse intervalo é encapsulado. Esses parâmetros são idênticos aos recebidos do ASA1.

Aqui está a saída da depuração:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_MY_AUTH_METHOD
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_GEN_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Generate my authentication data
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
     key len 5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK4_SIGN
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get my authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_OK_AUTH_GEN
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 CurState: R_BLD_AUTH 
     Event: EV_SEND_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Sending auth message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Vendor Specific Payload: 
     CISCO-GRANITE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3:   ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 (IPSec 
     negotiation),
  Num. transforms: 3
     AES-CBC   SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Construct Notify Payload: 
     ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORTIKEv2-PROTO-5: 
     Construct Notify Payload: NON_FIRST_FRAGSIKEv2-PROTO-3:
       (16):
  Building packet for encryption; contents are:
  VID  Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
       25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
  IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 12 Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
       51 01 01 01
  AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 28 Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
  Auth data&colon; 20 bytes
  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 44 IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, 
     reserved: 0x0, length: 40
    Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, #trans: 3
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
  TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  Next payload: NOTIFY, 
     reserved: 0x0, length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, 
     spi size: 0, type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
  NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 8 Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
     type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x1
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, flags: 
     RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
  ENCR  Next payload: VID, reserved: 0x0, length: 208
Encrypted data&colon; 204 bytes

ASA2 envia a resposta para o pacote IKE_AUTH:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->[10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

O ASA1 recebe a resposta do ASA2:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
     RECV PKT [IKE_AUTH] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->
     [10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xdfa3b583a4369958 
     RespSPI=0x27c943c13fd94665 
   MID=00000001

O ASA2 insere uma entrada no banco de dados SA (SAD):

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_OK
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: 
     Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing  
     the PKI session
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): 
     SA created; 
   inserting SA into database

O ASA1 verifica e processa os dados de autenticação neste pacote e, em seguida, insere este SA em seu SAD:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x1
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:DFA3B583A4369958 - r: 27C943C13FD94665]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: DFA3B583A4369958 - 
     rspi: 27C943C13FD94665
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: IKE_AUTH, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x1, length: 236
  REAL Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 168 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Vendor Specific Payload: (CUSTOM) VID  
     Next payload: IDr, reserved: 0x0, length: 20
  
       25 c9 42 c1 2c ee b5 22 3d b7 84 1a 75 e6 83 a6
  IDr  Next payload: AUTH, reserved: 0x0, length: 12
      Id type: IPv4 address, Reserved: 0x0 0x0
  
       51 01 01 01
  AUTH  Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 28
      Auth method PSK, reserved: 0x0, reserved 0x0
  Auth data&colon; 20 bytes
  SA  Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:   last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 3
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4:     last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
     TSi  Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.1.1, end addr: 192.168.1.1
  TSr  Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24 Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
      TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
      start port: 0, end port: 65535
      start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
     ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT NOTIFY(ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT)  
     Next payload: NOTIFY, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
      Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
     type: ESP_TFC_NO_SUPPORT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: Parse Notify Payload: 
     NON_FIRST_FRAGS NOTIFY(NON_FIRST_FRAGS)  Next payload:
     NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 8
      Security protocol id: IKE, spi size: 0, 
     type: NON_FIRST_FRAGS
  Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 236 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_WAIT_AUTH Event: EV_RECV_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Process auth response notify
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) peer auth method set to: 2
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH 
     Event: EV_CHK_IF_PEER_CERT_NEEDS_TO_BE_FETCHED_
     FOR_PROF_SEL
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_POLICY_BY_PEERID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Getting configured policies
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: connection initiated with tunnel 
     group 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunn grp type set to: L2L
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_POLICY_BY_PEERID
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify peer's policy
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_AUTH_TYPE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer authentication method
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_GET_PRESHR_KEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Get peer's preshared key for 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_VERIFY_AUTH
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Verify authentication data
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Use preshared key for id 10.0.0.2, 
     key len 5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_EAP
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Check for EAP exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_CONFIG_MODE
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_IKE_ONLY
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: I_PROC_AUTH Event: EV_PROC_SA_TS
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): Processing auth message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_OK
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_PKI_SESH_CLOSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16): Closing the PKI session
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE Event: EV_INSERT_IKE
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (16): SA created; inserting SA into 
   database

O túnel agora está ativo para o ASA1:

CONNECTION 
      STATUS: UP... 
     peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
     phase1_id: 10.0.0.2
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION

O túnel agora está ativo para o ASA2:

CONNECTION 
     STATUS: UP... 
     peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
     phase1_id: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
   Event: EV_REGISTER_SESSION

Observação: o túnel do respondente geralmente se torna ativo antes do túnel do iniciador.

O processo de registro de IKEv2 ocorre no ASA1:

IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
     connection 
     auth hdl set to 15
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
     attribute retrieval 
     successfully queued 
     for register session 
     request.
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
     timeout set to: 30
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
     timeout set to: 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
     policy set to 
     DfltGrpPolicy
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
     attr set
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
     protocol set to: 0x5c
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter 
     ID not configured 
     for connection
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
     lock set to: none
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
     not configured 
     for connection
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
     connection attribues 
     set valid to TRUE
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
     retrieved conn attrs
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
     registration after conn 
     attr retrieval 
     PASSED, No error
  IKEv2-PLAT-3:
  CONNECTION STATUS: 
     REGISTERED... 
     peer: 10.0.0.2:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.2

O processo de registro de IKEv2 ocorre no ASA2:

IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) 
     connection 
     auth hdl set to 15
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: AAA conn 
     attribute retrieval 
     successfully queued for 
     register session request.
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (16):
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (16): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=DFA3B583A4369958 
     R_SPI=27C943C13FD94665 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: AUTH_DONE 
     Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) idle 
     timeout 
     set to: 30
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) session 
     timeout 
     set to: 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
     policy set to 
     DfltGrpPolicy
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) class 
     attr set
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) tunnel 
     protocol set to: 0x5c
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv4 filter ID 
     not configured 
     for connection
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (16) group 
     lock set to: none
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: IPv6 filter ID 
     not configured 
     for connection
     attribues set 
     valid to TRUE
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Successfully 
     retrieved conn attrs
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Session 
     registration after conn 
     attr retrieval PASSED, 
     No error
  IKEv2-PLAT-3:
  CONNECTION STATUS: 
     REGISTERED... 
     peer: 10.0.0.1:500, 
   phase1_id: 10.0.0.1

Depurações SA filho

Observação: essa troca consiste em um único par de solicitação e resposta e é chamada de troca da fase 2 em IKEv1. Ele pode ser iniciado por qualquer extremidade do IKE_SA após a conclusão das trocas iniciais.

ASA2 inicia a troca CHILD_SA. Esta é a solicitação CREATE_CHILD_SA. O pacote CHILD_SA normalmente contém:

SA HDR - Contém o tipo version.flags e exchange.
Nonce Ni (opcional) - Se CHILD_SA for criado como parte da troca inicial, uma segunda carga de troca de chaves (KE) e nonce não deve ser enviada.
Payload de SA
KEi (Key-optional) - A solicitação CREATE_CHILD_SA pode, opcionalmente, conter um payload de KE para uma troca DH adicional a fim de permitir garantias mais fortes de sigilo de encaminhamento para CHILD_SA. Se as ofertas de SA incluírem diferentes grupos DH, o KEi deverá ser um elemento do grupo que o iniciador espera que o respondente aceite. Se ele achar errado, a troca CREATE_CHILD_SA falhará e terá que tentar novamente com um KEi diferente.
N (Notify payload, opcional) - O Notify Payload, é usado para transmitir dados informativos, como condições de erro e transições de estado, para um peer IKE. Um payload de notificação pode aparecer em uma mensagem de resposta (geralmente especifica por que uma solicitação é rejeitada), em uma troca de informações (a fim de relatar um erro não em uma solicitação IKE), ou em qualquer outra mensagem a fim de indicar os recursos do remetente ou a fim de modificar o significado da solicitação. Se essa troca CREATE_CHILD_SA fizer novo chaveamento de um SA atual diferente do IKE_SA, o payload do lead N do tipo REKEY_SA deverá identificar o SA que é rechaveado. Se essa troca CREATE_CHILD_SA não redigitar uma SA atual, a carga útil N deverá ser omitida.
TSi e TSr (opcional): mostra os seletores de tráfego para os quais o SA é criado. Nesse caso, é entre os hosts 192.168.1.12 e 192.168.2.99.

Esta é a saída da depuração CREATE_CHILD_SA:

IKEv2-PLAT-5: INVALID PSH HANDLE
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: attempting to find tunnel group 
     for IP: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: mapped to tunnel group 10.0.0.1 
     using peer IP
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: my_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: supported_peers_auth_method = 2
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: P1 ID = 0
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Translating IKE_ID_AUTO to = 255
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tp_name set to:
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tg_name set to: 10.0.0.1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (226) tunn grp type set to: L2L
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: PSH cleanup
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: READY 
     Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_INIT 
     Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_INIT_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for IPSEC rekey
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 
     CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 
     (I) MsgID = 00000001 CurState: CHILD_I_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_BLD_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
     (IPSec negotiation), num. transforms: 4
     AES-CBC SHA96 MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
     contents are:
     SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
     SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0:  
    length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  
  2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
  fa b7 f0 48
  TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if request will fit in 
     peer window
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x6
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
     flags: INITIATOR
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
  ENCR Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, length: 152
Encrypted data&colon; 148 bytes

O ASA2 envia esse pacote e espera pela resposta:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
     [CREATE_CHILD_SA]
     [10.0.0.2]:500->
     [10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
     RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
     MID=00000006
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_I_WAIT 
   Event: EV_NO_EVENT

O ASA1 recebe o pacote:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
     RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
     [10.0.0.2]:500->
     [10.0.0.1]:500 
     InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
     RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
     MID=00000006
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
     [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 
     10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6

O ASA1 recebe esse pacote exato do ASA2 e o verifica:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
     flags: INITIATOR 
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 180
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Request has mess_id 6; 
     expected 6 through 6
     REAL Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 124 bytes
     SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 52
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 48 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, 
     SPI size: 4, #trans: 4
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 ype: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: MD596
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  
  2d 3e ec 11 e0 c7 5d 67 d5 23 25 76 1d 50 0d 05
  fa b7 f0 48
  TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.2.99, end addr: 192.168.2.99
  TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
  Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 180 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: READY 
     Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
     Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_INIT 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 urState: CHILD_R_INIT 
   Event: EV_CHK_CC_TYPE

O ASA1 agora cria a resposta para a troca CHILD_SA. Esta é a Resposta CREATE_CHILD_SA. O pacote CHILD_SA normalmente contém:

SA HDR - Contém o tipo version.flags e exchange.
Nonce Ni (opcional) - Se CHILD_SA for criado como parte da troca inicial, um segundo payload de KE e nonce não devem ser enviados.
Payload de SA
KEi (Chave, opcional) - A solicitação CREATE_CHILD_SA pode, opcionalmente, conter um payload de KE para uma troca DH adicional a fim de permitir garantias mais fortes de sigilo de encaminhamento para CHILD_SA. Se as ofertas de SA incluírem diferentes grupos DH, o KEi deverá ser um elemento do grupo que o iniciador espera que o respondente aceite. Se ele achar errado, a troca CREATE_CHILD_SA falhará e deverá tentar novamente com um KEi diferente.
N (Notify payload, opcional) - O Notify Payload é usado para transmitir dados informativos, como condições de erro e transições de estado, para um peer IKE. Um payload de notificação pode aparecer em uma mensagem de resposta (geralmente especifica por que uma solicitação é rejeitada), em uma troca de informações (a fim de relatar um erro que não está em uma solicitação IKE), ou em qualquer outra mensagem a fim de indicar capacidades do remetente ou a fim de modificar o significado da solicitação. Se essa troca CREATE_CHILD_SA fizer novo chaveamento de um SA atual diferente do IKE_SA, o payload do lead N do tipo REKEY_SA deverá identificar o SA que é rechaveado. Se essa troca CREATE_CHILD_SA não redigitar uma SA atual, a carga útil N deverá ser omitida.
TSi e TSr (opcional) - Mostra os seletores de tráfego para os quais o SA é criado. Nesse caso, é entre os hosts 192.168.1.12 e 192.168.2.99.

Aqui está a saída da depuração:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Check for create child 
     response message type
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child 
     SA exchange
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: Selector received from peer 
     is accepted
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map 
     outside_map seq 1
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_NO_EVENT
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000005 
     CurState: EXIT Event: EV_FREE_NEG
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Deleting negotiation context 
     for peer message ID: 0x5
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC 
     Event: EV_OK_RECD_IPSEC_RESP
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
     CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_SET_IPSEC_DH_GRP
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Set IPSEC DH group
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_IPSEC Event: EV_OK
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Requesting SPI from IPSec
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_WAIT_SPI Event: EV_OK_GOT_SPI
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace->  
     SA:I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_BLD_MSG Event: EV_BLD_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Sending child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: ESP Proposal: 1, SPI size: 4 
    (IPSec negotiation),
  Num. transforms: 3
  AES-CBC SHA96 
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Building packet for encryption; 
     contents are:
  SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 40
  Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 3
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12
  type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8
  type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, 
     reserved: 0x0: length: 8
  type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  
  b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 
     18 1a 27 a6 cb
  01 56 22 ad
  TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
     length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
     end addr: 192.168.2.99
  TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
     length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.1.12, end addr: 192.168.1.12
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Tx 
     [L 10.0.0.1:500/R 10.0.0.2:500/VRF i0:f0] 
     m_id: 0x6
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE 
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
  ENCR Next payload: SA, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 144
Encrypted data&colon; 140 bytes

O ASA1 envia a resposta:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: SENT PKT 
     [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
     [10.0.0.1]:500->
     [10.0.0.2]:500 
     InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
     RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
   MID=00000006

O ASA2 recebe o pacote:

IKEv2-PLAT-4: 
     RECV PKT [CREATE_CHILD_SA] 
     [10.0.0.1]:500->
     [10.0.0.2]:500 
     InitSPI=0xfd366326e1fed6fe 
     RespSPI=0xa75b9b2582aaecb7 
     MID=00000006
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: Rx 
     [L 10.0.0.2:500/R 
     10.0.0.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
   m_id: 0x6

O ASA2 agora verifica o pacote:

IKEv2-PROTO-3: HDR[i:FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     r: A75B9B2582AAECB7]
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: IKEV2 HDR ispi: FD366326E1FED6FE - 
     rspi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Next payload: ENCR, version: 2.0
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Exchange type: CREATE_CHILD_SA, 
     flags: RESPONDER MSG-RESPONSE
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: Message id: 0x6, length: 172
  
  REAL Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 116 bytes
  SA Next payload: N, reserved: 0x0, length: 44
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last proposal: 0x0, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 40 Proposal: 1, Protocol id: ESP, SPI size: 4, 
     #trans: 3
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 12 type: 1, reserved: 0x0, id: AES-CBC
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x3, reserved: 0x0: 
     length: 8 type: 3, reserved: 0x0, id: SHA96
  IKEv2-PROTO-4: last transform: 0x0, 
     reserved: 0x0: length: 8 type: 5, reserved: 0x0, id:
  
  N Next payload: TSi, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  
  b7 6a c6 75 53 55 99 5a df ee 05 18 
     1a 27 a6 cb
  01 56 22 ad
  TSi Next payload: TSr, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
     length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.2.99, 
     end addr: 192.168.2.99
  TSr Next payload: NONE, reserved: 0x0, 
     length: 24
  Num of TSs: 1, reserved 0x0, reserved 0x0
  TS type: TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE, proto id: 0, 
     length: 16
  start port: 0, end port: 65535
  start addr: 192.168.1.12, 
     end addr: 192.168.1.12
  
  Decrypted packet:Data&colon; 172 bytes
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
     CHILD_I_WAIT Event: EV_RECV_CREATE_CHILD
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): Action: Action_Null
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_I_PROC Event: EV_CHK4_NOTIFY
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing any notify-messages 
     in child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_VERIFY_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Validating create child message
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_PROC_MSG
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): Processing child SA exchange
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (
     I) MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_CHK4_PFS
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking for PFS configuration
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_CHK_IKE_REKEY
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Checking if IKE SA rekey
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): SM Trace-> SA: 
     I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: CHILD_I_PROC 
     Event: EV_GEN_LOAD_IPSEC
  IKEv2-PROTO-3: (225): Load IPSEC key material
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: PROXY MATCH on crypto map outside_map seq 1
  IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (225) DPD Max Time will be: 10

O ASA1 insere essa entrada SA filha no SAD:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_R_DONE 
     Event: EV_OK
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
     SA created; inserting 
     SA into database
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (R) 
     MsgID = 00000006 CurState: 
     CHILD_R_DONE 
   Event: EV_START_DEL_NEG_TMR

O ASA2 insere essa entrada SA filha no SAD:

IKEv2-PROTO-5: (225): 
     SM Trace-> 
     SA: I_SPI=FD366326E1FED6FE 
     R_SPI=A75B9B2582AAECB7 (I) 
     MsgID = 00000006 
     CurState: CHILD_I_DONE 
     Event: EV_OK
  
  IKEv2-PROTO-2: (225): 
     SA created; 
   inserting SA into database

Verificação de túnel

Use as informações fornecidas nesta seção para verificar as configurações de túnel IPSec e Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP).

ISAKMP

Para verificar o ISAKMP, insira este comando:

show crypto isakmp sa det

ASA1

Aqui está a saída para o ASA1:

ASA1(config)#show cry isa sa det
There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id Local Remote Status Role
1889403559 10.0.0.1/500 10.0.0.2/500 READY RESPONDER

Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
Life/Active Time: 86400/195 sec
Session-id: 99220
Status Description: Negotiation done
Local spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7 Remote spi: FD366326E1FED6FE
Local id: 10.0.0.1
Remote id: 10.0.0.2
Local req mess id: 14 Remote req mess id: 16
Local next mess id: 14 Remote next mess id: 16
Local req queued: 14 Remote req queued: 16
Local window: 1 Remote window: 1
DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
NAT-T is not detected
Child sa: local selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a
AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0
CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
ah_hmac: _NONE,, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

ASA2

Esta é a saída do ASA2:

ASA2(config)#show cry isa sa det

  
There are no IKEv1 SAs

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id                Local               Remote    Status        Role
472237395         10.0.0.2/500         10.0.0.1/500     READY   INITIATOR
      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/190 sec
      Session-id: 99220
      Status Description: Negotiation done
      Local spi: FD366326E1FED6FE       Remote spi: A75B9B2582AAECB7
      Local id: 10.0.0.2
      Remote id: 10.0.0.1
      Local req mess id: 16             Remote req mess id: 13
      Local next mess id: 16            Remote next mess id: 13
      Local req queued: 16              Remote req queued: 13
      Local window: 1                   Remote window: 1
      DPD configured for 10 seconds, retry 2
      NAT-T is not detected  
Child sa: local selector  192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          remote selector 192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8717a5a/0x8564387d  
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0  
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0  
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel
Child sa: local selector  192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          remote selector 192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0xf0d97b2a/0x74756292  
          AH spi in/out: 0x0/0x0  
          CPI in/out: 0x0/0x0  
          Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, esp_hmac: SHA96
          ah_hmac: None, comp: IPCOMP_NONE, mode tunnel

IPSec

Para verificar o IPSec, insira este comando:

show crypto ipsec sa

ASA1

Aqui está a saída para o ASA1:

ASA1(config)#show cry ipsec sa

  interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.1 
        host 192.168.2.99
       local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
          (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
          192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
       current_peer: 10.0.0.2

       #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
       #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
       #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
       #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
          #pkts decomp failed: 0
       #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
          #fragments created: 0
       #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, 
          #decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
       #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

       local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto endpt.: 
          10.0.0.2/500
       path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
       current outbound spi: F0D97B2A
       current inbound spi : 74756292

     inbound esp sas:
       spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
          transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
          in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
          slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
          sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4008959/28628)
          IV size: 16 bytes
          replay detection support: Y
          Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4147199/28628)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
           0x00000000 0x00000001

    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.1

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.1.12 
        host 192.168.2.99
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
        192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.2
      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 08717A5A
      current inbound spi : 8564387D

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137990144, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28734)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
     Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x00000001

ASA2

Esta é a saída do ASA2:

ASA2(config)#show cry ipsec sa

  interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

      access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 host 
        192.168.1.12
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
        (192.168.1.12/255.255.255.255/0/0)
      current_peer: 10.0.0.1

      #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
      #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
        #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
        #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
        reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
        endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 8564387D
      current inbound spi : 08717A5A

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x08717A5A (141654618)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4193279/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x0000000F
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x8564387D (2237937789)
         transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4055039/28770)
         IV size: 16 bytes         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001

   Crypto map tag: outside_map, seq num: 1, local addr: 10.0.0.2

     access-list l2l_list extended permit ip host 192.168.2.99 
       host 192.168.1.1
     local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (
       192.168.2.99/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): 
       (192.168.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
     current_peer: 10.0.0.1
     #pkts encaps: 3, #pkts encrypt: 3, #pkts digest: 3
     #pkts decaps: 3, #pkts decrypt: 3, #pkts verify: 3
     #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
     #pkts not compressed: 3, #pkts comp failed: 0, 
       #pkts decomp failed: 0
     #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, 
       #fragments created: 0
     #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing 
       reassembly: 0
     #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

     local crypto endpt.: 10.0.0.2/500, remote crypto 
       endpt.: 10.0.0.1/500
     path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
     current outbound spi: 74756292
     current inbound spi : F0D97B2A

   inbound esp sas:
     spi: 0xF0D97B2A (4040784682)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4285439/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x0000000F
   outbound esp sas:
     spi: 0x74756292 (1953850002)
        transform: esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac no compression
        in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
        slot: 0, conn_id: 137973760, crypto-map: outside_map
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4331519/28663)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Anti replay bitmap:
         0x00000000 0x00000001

Você também pode verificar a saída do comando show crypto ikev2 sa, que fornece uma saída idêntica à saída do comando show crypto isakmp sa:

IKEv2 SAs:

Session-id:99220, Status:UP-ACTIVE, IKE count:1, CHILD count:2

Tunnel-id                Local               Remote   Status        Role
1889403559         10.0.0.1/500         10.0.0.2/500    READY   RESPONDER
      Encr: 3DES, Hash: MD596, DH Grp:2, Auth sign: PSK, Auth verify: PSK
      Life/Active Time: 86400/179 sec
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.12/0 - 192.168.1.12/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x8564387d/0x8717a5a
Child sa: local selector  192.168.1.1/0 - 192.168.1.1/65535
          remote selector 192.168.2.99/0 - 192.168.2.99/65535
          ESP spi in/out: 0x74756292/0xf0d97b2a

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Histórico de revisões

Revisão	Data de publicação	Comentários
3.0	04-Apr-2024	Recertificação.
1.0	28-Jan-2013	Versão inicial

Colaborado por engenheiros da Cisco

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Usar depurações ASA IKEv2 para VPN site a site com PSKs

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Contents

Introdução

Pré-requisitos

Requisitos

Componentes Utilizados

Problema principal

Depurações usadas

Configurações do ASA

ASA1

ASA2

Debugs

Negociação de túnel

Depurações SA filho

Verificação de túnel

ISAKMP

ASA1

ASA2

IPSec

ASA1

ASA2

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Histórico de revisões

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