Este documento muestra cómo formar un túnel IPsec con claves previamente compartidas para unir dos redes privadas:
Una red privada dentro del Concentrador VPN 3000 de Cisco (192.168.1.x).
Una red privada dentro del firewall Checkpoint 4.1 (10.32.50.x ).
Se supone que el tráfico desde el interior del VPN Concentrator y dentro del Checkpoint a Internet (representado en este documento por las redes 172.18.124.x) fluye antes de que comience esta configuración.
No hay requisitos específicos para este documento.
La información que contiene este documento se basa en las siguientes versiones de software y hardware.
VPN 3000 Concentrator
Software Concentrador VPN 3000 versión 2.5.2.F
Escudo de protección de punto de control 4.1
La información que contiene este documento se creó a partir de los dispositivos en un ambiente de laboratorio específico. Todos los dispositivos que se utilizan en este documento se pusieron en funcionamiento con una configuración verificada (predeterminada). If your network is live, make sure that you understand the potential impact of any command.
En este documento, se utiliza esta configuración de red:
Complete estos pasos para configurar el concentrador VPN 3000.
Seleccione Configuration > System > Tunneling Protocols > IPSec > IKE Proposals > Modify para crear una propuesta de Intercambio de claves de Internet (IKE) denominada "des-sha" con hash de algoritmo hash seguro (SHA), estándar de cifrado de datos (DES) y Diffie-Hellman Group 1. Deje el valor predeterminado de Tiempo de vida en 86400 segundos.
Nota: El intervalo válido para la duración IKE del concentrador VPN es de 60-2147483647 segundos.
Seleccione Configuration (Configuración) > System (Sistema) > Tunneling Protocols (Protocolos de tunelización) > IPSec > IKE Proposals (Propuestas IKE). Seleccione "des-sha" y haga clic en Activate (Activar) para activar la propuesta IKE.
Seleccione Configuration (Configuración) > System (Sistema) > Tunneling Protocols (Protocolos de tunelización) > IPSec (LAN a LAN> Add (Agregar).
Configure un túnel IPsec denominado "to_checkpoint" con la dirección de punto de control como Peer. Para la clave precompartida, ingrese la clave actual. En Autenticación, seleccione ESP/SHA/HMAC-160 y seleccione DES-56 para el cifrado. Ingrese la propuesta IKE ("des-sha" en este ejemplo) y las redes locales y remotas.
Seleccione Configuration (Configuración) > Policy Management (Administración de políticas) > Traffic Management (Administración de tráfico) > Security Associations (Asociaciones de seguridad) > Modify (Modificar). Verifique que Perfect Forward Secrecy esté inhabilitado y deje el valor de IPsec Time Lifetime en el valor predeterminado de 2800 segundos.
Nota: El rango válido para la duración de IPsec del concentrador VPN es de 60-2147483647 segundos.
Guarde la configuración.
Complete estos pasos para configurar el firewall Checkpoint 4.1.
Dado que las duraciones predeterminadas de IKE e IPsec difieren entre los proveedores, seleccione Properties > Encryption para establecer las duraciones de los puntos de control de modo que coincidan con los valores predeterminados del concentrador VPN.
La duración IKE predeterminada del concentrador VPN es de 86400 segundos (=1440 minutos).
La duración predeterminada de IPsec del concentrador VPN es de 28800 segundos.
Seleccione Manage (Administración) > Network Objects (Objetos de red) > New (o Edit) Nuevo (o Editar) > Network (Red) para configurar el objeto para la red interna ("cpinside") detrás del punto de control. Esto debe coincidir con la "Red remota" en el concentrador VPN.
Seleccione Manage > Network objects > Edit para editar el objeto para el extremo del gateway ("RTPCPVPN" Checkpoint) que el concentrador VPN tiene en su parámetro Peer.
En Location (Ubicación), seleccione Internal (Interna). En Type (Tipo), seleccione Gateway. En Módulos instalados, marque VPN-1 y FireWall-1 y marque Estación de administración.
Seleccione Manage > Network objects > New (or Edit) > Network para configurar el objeto para la red externa ("inside_cisco") detrás del VPN Concentrator. Esto debe coincidir con la red "Local" en el concentrador VPN.
Seleccione Manage > Network objects > New > Workstation para agregar un objeto para la gateway del concentrador VPN externo ("cisco_endpoint"). Ésta es la interfaz "pública" del concentrador VPN.
En Location (Ubicación), seleccione External (Externa). En Type (Tipo), seleccione Gateway.
Nota: No seleccione la casilla de verificación VPN-1/FireWall-1.
Seleccione Manage (Administración) > Network objects (Objetos de red) > Edit (Editar) para editar la ficha VPN del punto final del punto de control Gateway (denominado"RTPCPVPN''). En Domain (Dominio), seleccione Other (Otro) y luego, seleccione el interior de la red de Punto de control (denominado ''cpinside'') en la lista desplegable. Bajo los esquemas de encripción definidos, seleccione IKE y luego haga clic en Edit (Editar).
Cambie las propiedades IKE para que el cifrado DES esté de acuerdo con el DES-56 y el algoritmo de cifrado en el concentrador VPN.
Cambie las propiedades IKE a hashing SHA1 para que coincidan con el algoritmo SHA/HMAC-160 en el concentrador VPN.
Cancelar la selección del modo agresivo
Marque Admite subredes.
Marque Pre-Shared Secret en Authentication Method . Esto concuerda con el modo de autenticación del concentrador VPN, Claves previamente compartidas.
Haga clic en Edit Secrets para configurar la clave previamente compartida de modo que coincida con la clave previamente compartida del concentrador VPN.
isakmp key key address address netmask netmask
Seleccione Manage (Administración) > Network Objects (Objetos de red) > Edit (Editar) para editar la ficha VPN de "cisco_endpoint". En Domain, seleccione Other y luego, seleccione el interior de la red de Cisco (denominado "inside_cisco"). Bajo los esquemas de encripción definidos, seleccione IKE y luego haga clic en Edit (Editar).
Cambie las propiedades IKE del cifrado DES para que concuerden con el algoritmo de cifrado DES-56 en el concentrador VPN.
Cambie las propiedades IKE a hashing SHA1 para que coincidan con el algoritmo SHA/HMAC-160 en el concentrador VPN.
Cambie estos parámetros:
Anule la selección del modo agresivo.
Marque Admite subredes.
Marque Pre-Shared Secret en Authentication Method . Esto concuerda con el Modo de Autenticación del Concentrador VPN de Claves Previamente Compartidas.
Haga clic en Edit Secrets para configurar la clave previamente compartida de modo que coincida con la clave previamente compartida del concentrador VPN real.
En la ventana del editor de políticas, ingrese una ventana tanto con el origen como con el destino, como en "inside_cisco'' y "cpinside" (bidireccional). Set Service=Any, Action=Encrypt, y Track=Long.
En el encabezado Acción, haga clic en el icono verde Cifrar y seleccione Editar propiedades para configurar las políticas de cifrado.
Seleccione IKE y luego haga clic en Edit (Editar).
En la ventana Propiedades IKE, cambie estas propiedades para que coincidan con las transformaciones IPsec del concentrador VPN.
En Transform (Transformar), seleccione Encryption (Encriptación) + Data Integrity (ESP) (Integridad de datos (ESP)). El Algoritmo de encripción debería ser DES, la Integridad de los datos debería ser SHA1 y la Gateway de par permitida debería ser la gateway externa Cisco (que se llama "cisco_endpoint"). Click OK.
Después de configurar el punto de control, seleccione Policy > Install en el menú Checkpoint para que los cambios surtan efecto.
Actualmente, no hay un procedimiento de verificación disponible para esta configuración.
En esta sección encontrará información que puede utilizar para solucionar problemas de configuración.
Cuando se configuran varias redes internas adyacentes en el dominio de cifrado del punto de control, el dispositivo puede resumirlas automáticamente en relación con el tráfico interesante. Si el concentrador VPN no está configurado para coincidir, es probable que el túnel falle. Por ejemplo, si las redes internas de 10.0.0.0 /24 y 10.0.1.0 /24 están configuradas para ser incluidas en el túnel, se pueden resumir en 10.0.0.0 /23.
Las posibles depuraciones del concentrador VPN incluyen IKE, IKEDBG, IKEDECODE, IPSEC, IPSECDBG, IPSECDECODE. Esto está establecido en Configuration (Configuración) > System (Sistema) > Events (Eventos) > Classes (Clases).
Puede ver las depuraciones en Monitoring (Monitoreo) > Event log (Registro de evento) > Get log (Obtener registro).
Seleccione Monitoring > Sessions para supervisar el tráfico de túnel de LAN a LAN.
Seleccione Administration > Administer Sessions > LAN-to-LAN sessions > Actions - Logout para borrar el túnel.
Nota: se trataba de una instalación de Microsoft Windows NT. Dado que el seguimiento se configuró en Long (Prolongado) en la ventana del editor de políticas, el tráfico rechazado deberá aparecer en rojo en el visor de registros. Se puede obtener una depuración más detallada con:
C:\WINNT\FW1\4.1\fwstop C:\WINNT\FW1\4.1\fw d -d
y en otra ventana.
C:\WINNT\FW1\4.1\fwstart
Ejecute estos comandos para borrar las SA en el punto de control:
fw tab -t IKE_SA_table -x fw tab -t ISAKMP_ESP_table -x fw tab -t inbound_SPI -x fw tab -t ISAKMP_AH_table -x
Responda sí en el mensaje ¿Está seguro?.
Concentrador Cisco VPN 3000
1 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=180 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): EF 61 3C 27 07 74 1B 25 Responder Cookie(8): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Next Payload : SA (1) Exchange Type : Oakley Main Mode Flags : 0 Message ID : 0 Length : 164 7 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=406 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + SA (1) + VENDOR (13) + NONE (0) ... total length : 164 9 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=407 172.18.124.157 processing SA payload 10 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=181 172.18.124.157 SA Payload Decode : DOI : IPSEC (1) Situation : Identity Only (1) Length : 92 13 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=182 172.18.124.157 Proposal Decode: Proposal # : 1 Protocol ID : ISAKMP (1) #of Transforms: 2 Length : 80 16 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=183 172.18.124.157 Transform # 1 Decode for Proposal # 1: Transform # : 1 Transform ID : IKE (1) Length : 36 18 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=184 172.18.124.157 Phase 1 SA Attribute Decode for Transform # 1: Encryption Alg: DES-CBC (1) Hash Alg : SHA (2) Auth Method : Preshared Key (1) DH Group : Oakley Group 2 (2) Life Time : 86400 seconds 23 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=185 172.18.124.157 Transform # 2 Decode for Proposal # 1: Transform # : 2 Transform ID : IKE (1) Length : 36 25 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=186 172.18.124.157 Phase 1 SA Attribute Decode for Transform # 2: Encryption Alg: DES-CBC (1) Hash Alg : SHA (2) Auth Method : Preshared Key (1) DH Group : Oakley Group 1 (1) Life Time : 86400 seconds 30 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=408 172.18.124.157 Proposal # 1, Transform # 1, Type ISAKMP, Id IKE Parsing received transform: Phase 1 failure against global IKE proposal # 1: Mismatched attr types for class DH Group: Rcv'd: Oakley Group 2 Cfg'd: Oakley Group 1 35 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=409 172.18.124.157 Phase 1 failure against global IKE proposal # 2: Mismatched attr types for class DH Group: Rcv'd: Oakley Group 2 Cfg'd: Oakley Group 1 38 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=410 172.18.124.157 Phase 1 failure against global IKE proposal # 3: Mismatched attr types for class Encryption Alg: Rcv'd: DES-CBC Cfg'd: Triple-DES 41 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=411 172.18.124.157 Oakley proposal is acceptable 42 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=107 172.18.124.157 processing vid payload 43 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=412 172.18.124.157 processing IKE SA 44 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=413 172.18.124.157 Proposal # 1, Transform # 1, Type ISAKMP, Id IKE Parsing received transform: Phase 1 failure against global IKE proposal # 1: Mismatched attr types for class DH Group: Rcv'd: Oakley Group 2 Cfg'd: Oakley Group 1 49 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=414 172.18.124.157 Phase 1 failure against global IKE proposal # 2: Mismatched attr types for class DH Group: Rcv'd: Oakley Group 2 Cfg'd: Oakley Group 1 52 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=415 172.18.124.157 Phase 1 failure against global IKE proposal # 3: Mismatched attr types for class Encryption Alg: Rcv'd: DES-CBC Cfg'd: Triple-DES 55 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=7 IKEDBG/28 RPT=3 172.18.124.157 IKE SA Proposal # 1, Transform # 2 acceptable Matches global IKE entry # 1 56 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=416 172.18.124.157 constructing ISA_SA for isakmp 57 02/13/2001 14:21:28.530 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=417 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + SA (1) ... total length : 84 58 02/13/2001 14:21:28.630 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=187 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): EF 61 3C 27 07 74 1B 25 Responder Cookie(8): 24 18 40 A1 3B E4 95 26 Next Payload : KE (4) Exchange Type : Oakley Main Mode Flags : 0 Message ID : 0 Length : 152 64 02/13/2001 14:21:28.630 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=418 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4) + NONCE (10) + NONE (0) ... total length : 152 66 02/13/2001 14:21:28.630 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=419 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4) + NONCE (10) + NONE (0) ... total length : 152 68 02/13/2001 14:21:28.630 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=420 172.18.124.157 processing ke payload 69 02/13/2001 14:21:28.630 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=421 172.18.124.157 processing ISA_KE 70 02/13/2001 14:21:28.630 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=108 172.18.124.157 processing nonce payload 71 02/13/2001 14:21:28.650 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=422 172.18.124.157 constructing ke payload 72 02/13/2001 14:21:28.650 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=109 172.18.124.157 constructing nonce payload 73 02/13/2001 14:21:28.650 SEV=9 IKEDBG/38 RPT=7 172.18.124.157 Constructing VPN 3000 spoofing IOS Vendor ID payload (version: 1.0.0, capabiliti es: 20000001) 75 02/13/2001 14:21:28.650 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=110 172.18.124.157 constructing vid payload 76 02/13/2001 14:21:28.650 SEV=9 IKE/0 RPT=26 172.18.124.157 Generating keys for Responder... 77 02/13/2001 14:21:28.650 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=423 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4) ... total length : 192 78 02/13/2001 14:21:28.770 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=188 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): EF 61 3C 27 07 74 1B 25 Responder Cookie(8): 24 18 40 A1 3B E4 95 26 Next Payload : ID (5) Exchange Type : Oakley Main Mode Flags : 1 (ENCRYPT ) Message ID : 0 Length : 68 84 02/13/2001 14:21:28.770 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=424 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + ID (5) + HASH (8) + NONE (0) ... total length : 64 86 02/13/2001 14:21:28.770 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=111 172.18.124.157 Processing ID 87 02/13/2001 14:21:28.770 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=425 172.18.124.157 processing hash 88 02/13/2001 14:21:28.770 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=426 172.18.124.157 computing hash 89 02/13/2001 14:21:28.770 SEV=9 IKEDBG/23 RPT=7 172.18.124.157 Starting group lookup for peer 172.18.124.157 90 02/13/2001 14:21:28.870 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=427 172.18.124.157 Found Phase 1 Group (172.18.124.157) 91 02/13/2001 14:21:28.870 SEV=7 IKEDBG/14 RPT=7 172.18.124.157 Authentication configured for Internal 92 02/13/2001 14:21:28.870 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=112 172.18.124.157 constructing ID 93 02/13/2001 14:21:28.870 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=428 construct hash payload 94 02/13/2001 14:21:28.870 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=429 172.18.124.157 computing hash 95 02/13/2001 14:21:28.870 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=430 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + ID (5) ... total length : 64 96 02/13/2001 14:21:28.870 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=431 172.18.124.157 Starting phase 1 rekey timer 97 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=189 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): EF 61 3C 27 07 74 1B 25 Responder Cookie(8): 24 18 40 A1 3B E4 95 26 Next Payload : HASH (8) Exchange Type : Oakley Quick Mode Flags : 1 (ENCRYPT ) Message ID : 7755aa11 Length : 164 104 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=432 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=7755aa11) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) + SA (1) + NONCE (10) + ID (5) + ID (5) + NONE (0) ... total leng th : 160 107 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=433 172.18.124.157 processing hash 108 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=434 172.18.124.157 processing SA payload 109 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=190 172.18.124.157 SA Payload Decode : DOI : IPSEC (1) Situation : Identity Only (1) Length : 52 112 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=191 172.18.124.157 Proposal Decode: Proposal # : 1 Protocol ID : ESP (3) #of Transforms: 1 Spi : DA 16 3F E3 Length : 40 116 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=192 172.18.124.157 Transform # 1 Decode for Proposal # 1: Transform # : 1 Transform ID : DES-CBC (2) Length : 28 118 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=193 172.18.124.157 Phase 2 SA Attribute Decode for Transform # 1: Life Time : 28800 seconds HMAC Algorithm: SHA (2) Encapsulation : Tunnel (1) 121 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=113 172.18.124.157 processing nonce payload 122 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=114 172.18.124.157 Processing ID 123 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=5 IKE/35 RPT=14 172.18.124.157 Received remote IP Proxy Subnet data in ID Payload: Address 10.32.50.0, Mask 255.255.255.0, Protocol 0, Port 0 125 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=115 172.18.124.157 Processing ID 126 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=5 IKE/34 RPT=14 172.18.124.157 Received local IP Proxy Subnet data in ID Payload: Address 192.168.1.0, Mask 255.255.255.0, Protocol 0, Port 0 128 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=5 IKE/66 RPT=4 172.18.124.157 IKE Remote Peer configured for SA: L2L: to_checkpoint 129 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=435 172.18.124.157 processing IPSEC SA 130 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=7 IKEDBG/27 RPT=1 172.18.124.157 IPSec SA Proposal # 1, Transform # 1 acceptable 131 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=436 172.18.124.157 IKE: requesting SPI! 132 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=8 IKEDBG/6 RPT=6 IKE got SPI from key engine: SPI = 0x4d6e483f 133 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=437 172.18.124.157 oakley constucting quick mode 134 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=438 172.18.124.157 constructing blank hash 135 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=439 172.18.124.157 constructing ISA_SA for ipsec 136 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=116 172.18.124.157 constructing ipsec nonce payload 137 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=117 172.18.124.157 constructing proxy ID 138 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=440 172.18.124.157 Transmitting Proxy Id: Remote subnet: 10.32.50.0 Mask 255.255.255.0 Protocol 0 Port 0 Local subnet: 192.168.1.0 mask 255.255.255.0 Protocol 0 Port 0 141 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=441 172.18.124.157 constructing qm hash 142 02/13/2001 14:21:29.030 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=442 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=7755aa11) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) ... total length : 156 144 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=194 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): EF 61 3C 27 07 74 1B 25 Responder Cookie(8): 24 18 40 A1 3B E4 95 26 Next Payload : HASH (8) Exchange Type : Oakley Quick Mode Flags : 1 (ENCRYPT ) Message ID : 7755aa11 Length : 60 151 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=443 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=7755aa11) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) + NONE (0) ... total length : 52 153 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=444 172.18.124.157 processing hash 154 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=445 172.18.124.157 loading all IPSEC SAs 155 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=118 172.18.124.157 Generating Quick Mode Key! 156 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=119 172.18.124.157 Generating Quick Mode Key! 157 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=446 172.18.124.157 Loading subnet: Dst: 192.168.1.0 mask: 255.255.255.0 Src: 10.32.50.0 mask: 255.255.255.0 159 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=4 IKE/49 RPT=6 172.18.124.157 Security negotiation complete for LAN-to-LAN Group (172.18.124.157) Responder, Inbound SPI = 0x4d6e483f, Outbound SPI = 0xda163fe3 161 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=8 IKEDBG/7 RPT=6 IKE got a KEY_ADD msg for SA: SPI = 0xda163fe3 162 02/13/2001 14:21:29.270 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=447 pitcher: rcv KEY_UPDATE, spi 0x4d6e483f 163 02/13/2001 14:21:29.670 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=195 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): EF 61 3C 27 07 74 1B 25 Responder Cookie(8): 24 18 40 A1 3B E4 95 26 Next Payload : HASH (8) Exchange Type : Oakley Quick Mode Flags : 1 (ENCRYPT ) Message ID : 7755aa11 Length : 60 170 02/13/2001 14:21:29.670 SEV=6 IKE/0 RPT=27 172.18.124.157 Duplicate Phase 2 packet detected! 171 02/13/2001 14:21:29.760 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=196 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): EF 61 3C 27 07 74 1B 25 Responder Cookie(8): 24 18 40 A1 3B E4 95 26 Next Payload : HASH (8) Exchange Type : Oakley Quick Mode Flags : 1 (ENCRYPT ) Message ID : 7755aa11 Length : 60 178 02/13/2001 14:21:29.760 SEV=6 IKE/0 RPT=28 172.18.124.157 Duplicate Phase 2 packet detected! 179 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=448 pitcher: recv KEY_SA_ACTIVE spi 0x4d6e483f 180 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=449 KEY_SA_ACTIVE old rekey centry found with new spi 0x4d6e483f 181 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=7 IKEDBG/9 RPT=5 172.18.124.157 IKE Deleting SA: Remote Proxy 10.32.50.0, Local Proxy 192.168.1.0 182 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=450 172.18.124.157 IKE SA MM:f2ea8e68 rcv'd Terminate: state MM_ACTIVE_REKEY flags 0x000000e6, refcnt 1, tuncnt 0 184 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=451 172.18.124.157 IKE SA MM:f2ea8e68 terminating: flags 0x000000a6, refcnt 0, tuncnt 0 185 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=452 sending delete message 186 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=453 172.18.124.157 constructing blank hash 187 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=454 constructing delete payload 188 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=455 172.18.124.157 constructing qm hash 189 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=456 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=87b7c1a4) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) ... total length : 80 191 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=457 172.18.124.157 IKE SA MM:241840a1 rcv'd Terminate: state MM_REKEY_DONE flags 0x00000082, refcnt 1, tuncnt 1 193 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=6 IKE/0 RPT=29 172.18.124.157 Removing peer from peer table failed, no match! 194 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=458 sending delete message 195 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=459 172.18.124.157 constructing blank hash 196 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=460 constructing ipsec delete payload 197 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=461 172.18.124.157 constructing qm hash 198 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=462 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=63f2abb8) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) ... total length : 68 200 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=7 IKEDBG/9 RPT=6 172.18.124.157 IKE Deleting SA: Remote Proxy 10.32.50.0, Local Proxy 192.168.1.0 201 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=463 172.18.124.157 IKE SA MM:241840a1 terminating: flags 0x00000082, refcnt 0, tuncnt 0 202 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=464 sending delete message 203 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=465 172.18.124.157 constructing blank hash 204 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=466 constructing delete payload 205 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=467 172.18.124.157 constructing qm hash 206 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=468 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=d6a00071) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) ... total length : 80 208 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=4 AUTH/22 RPT=13 User 172.18.124.157 disconnected 209 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=469 pitcher: received key delete msg, spi 0x2962069b 210 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=470 pitcher: received key delete msg, spi 0xda163fe2 211 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=471 pitcher: received key delete msg, spi 0x4d6e483f 212 02/13/2001 14:21:29.880 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=472 pitcher: received key delete msg, spi 0xda163fe3 213 02/13/2001 14:21:29.890 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=473 pitcher: received a key acquire message! 214 02/13/2001 14:21:29.890 SEV=4 IKE/41 RPT=6 172.18.124.157 IKE Initiator: New Phase 1, Intf 2, IKE Peer 172.18.124.157 local Proxy Address 192.168.1.0, remote Proxy Address 10.32.50.0, SA (L2L: to_checkpoint) 217 02/13/2001 14:21:29.890 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=474 172.18.124.157 constructing ISA_SA for isakmp 218 02/13/2001 14:21:29.890 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=475 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + SA (1) ... total length : 84 219 02/13/2001 14:21:30.430 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=197 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): FE 75 39 26 66 21 F6 F8 Responder Cookie(8): 67 1D 73 71 AE 2B 88 2E Next Payload : SA (1) Exchange Type : Oakley Main Mode Flags : 0 Message ID : 0 Length : 84 225 02/13/2001 14:21:30.430 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=476 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + SA (1) + NONE (0) ... total length : 84 227 02/13/2001 14:21:30.430 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=477 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + SA (1) + NONE (0) ... total length : 84 229 02/13/2001 14:21:30.430 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=478 172.18.124.157 processing SA payload 230 02/13/2001 14:21:30.430 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=198 172.18.124.157 SA Payload Decode : DOI : IPSEC (1) Situation : Identity Only (1) Length : 56 233 02/13/2001 14:21:30.430 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=199 172.18.124.157 Proposal Decode: Proposal # : 1 Protocol ID : ISAKMP (1) #of Transforms: 1 Length : 44 236 02/13/2001 14:21:30.430 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=200 172.18.124.157 Transform # 1 Decode for Proposal # 1: Transform # : 1 Transform ID : IKE (1) Length : 36 238 02/13/2001 14:21:30.440 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=201 172.18.124.157 Phase 1 SA Attribute Decode for Transform # 1: Encryption Alg: DES-CBC (1) Hash Alg : SHA (2) DH Group : Oakley Group 1 (1) Auth Method : Preshared Key (1) Life Time : 86400 seconds 243 02/13/2001 14:21:30.440 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=479 172.18.124.157 Oakley proposal is acceptable 244 02/13/2001 14:21:30.440 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=480 172.18.124.157 constructing ke payload 245 02/13/2001 14:21:30.440 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=120 172.18.124.157 constructing nonce payload 246 02/13/2001 14:21:30.440 SEV=9 IKEDBG/38 RPT=8 172.18.124.157 Constructing VPN 3000 spoofing IOS Vendor ID payload (version: 1.0.0, capabiliti es: 20000001) 248 02/13/2001 14:21:30.440 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=121 172.18.124.157 constructing vid payload 249 02/13/2001 14:21:30.440 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=481 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4) ... total length : 192 250 02/13/2001 14:21:30.540 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=202 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): FE 75 39 26 66 21 F6 F8 Responder Cookie(8): 67 1D 73 71 AE 2B 88 2E Next Payload : KE (4) Exchange Type : Oakley Main Mode Flags : 0 Message ID : 0 Length : 152 256 02/13/2001 14:21:30.540 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=482 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4) + NONCE (10) + NONE (0) ... total length : 152 258 02/13/2001 14:21:30.540 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=483 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + KE (4) + NONCE (10) + NONE (0) ... total length : 152 260 02/13/2001 14:21:30.540 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=484 172.18.124.157 processing ke payload 261 02/13/2001 14:21:30.540 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=485 172.18.124.157 processing ISA_KE 262 02/13/2001 14:21:30.540 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=122 172.18.124.157 processing nonce payload 263 02/13/2001 14:21:30.560 SEV=9 IKE/0 RPT=30 172.18.124.157 Generating keys for Initiator... 264 02/13/2001 14:21:30.570 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=123 172.18.124.157 constructing ID 265 02/13/2001 14:21:30.570 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=486 construct hash payload 266 02/13/2001 14:21:30.570 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=487 172.18.124.157 computing hash 267 02/13/2001 14:21:30.570 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=488 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + ID (5) ... total length : 64 268 02/13/2001 14:21:30.740 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=203 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): FE 75 39 26 66 21 F6 F8 Responder Cookie(8): 67 1D 73 71 AE 2B 88 2E Next Payload : ID (5) Exchange Type : Oakley Main Mode Flags : 1 (ENCRYPT ) Message ID : 0 Length : 68 274 02/13/2001 14:21:30.740 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=489 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=0) with payloads : HDR + ID (5) + HASH (8) + NONE (0) ... total length : 64 276 02/13/2001 14:21:30.740 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=124 172.18.124.157 Processing ID 277 02/13/2001 14:21:30.740 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=490 172.18.124.157 processing hash 278 02/13/2001 14:21:30.740 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=491 172.18.124.157 computing hash 279 02/13/2001 14:21:30.740 SEV=9 IKEDBG/23 RPT=8 172.18.124.157 Starting group lookup for peer 172.18.124.157 280 02/13/2001 14:21:30.830 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=204 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): FE 75 39 26 66 21 F6 F8 Responder Cookie(8): 67 1D 73 71 AE 2B 88 2E Next Payload : ID (5) Exchange Type : Oakley Main Mode Flags : 1 (ENCRYPT ) Message ID : 0 Length : 68 286 02/13/2001 14:21:30.830 SEV=6 IKE/0 RPT=31 172.18.124.157 Duplicate Phase 1 packet detected! 287 02/13/2001 14:21:30.830 SEV=6 IKE/0 RPT=32 MM received unexpected event EV_RESEND_MSG in state MM_I_DONE 288 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=492 172.18.124.157 Found Phase 1 Group (172.18.124.157) 289 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=7 IKEDBG/14 RPT=8 172.18.124.157 Authentication configured for Internal 290 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=493 172.18.124.157 Oakley begin quick mode 291 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=494 172.18.124.157 Starting phase 1 rekey timer 292 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=4 AUTH/21 RPT=15 User 172.18.124.157 connected 293 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=8 IKEDBG/6 RPT=7 IKE got SPI from key engine: SPI = 0x08201539 294 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=495 172.18.124.157 oakley constucting quick mode 295 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=496 172.18.124.157 constructing blank hash 296 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=497 172.18.124.157 constructing ISA_SA for ipsec 297 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=125 172.18.124.157 constructing ipsec nonce payload 298 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=126 172.18.124.157 constructing proxy ID 299 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=498 172.18.124.157 Transmitting Proxy Id: Local subnet: 192.168.1.0 mask 255.255.255.0 Protocol 0 Port 0 Remote subnet: 10.32.50.0 Mask 255.255.255.0 Protocol 0 Port 0 302 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=499 172.18.124.157 constructing qm hash 303 02/13/2001 14:21:30.840 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=500 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=23bc1709) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) ... total length : 184 305 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=205 172.18.124.157 ISAKMP HEADER : ( Version 1.0 ) Initiator Cookie(8): FE 75 39 26 66 21 F6 F8 Responder Cookie(8): 67 1D 73 71 AE 2B 88 2E Next Payload : HASH (8) Exchange Type : Oakley Quick Mode Flags : 1 (ENCRYPT ) Message ID : 23bc1709 Length : 164 312 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=501 172.18.124.157 RECEIVED Message (msgid=23bc1709) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) + SA (1) + NONCE (10) + ID (5) + ID (5) + NONE (0) ... total leng th : 156 315 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=502 172.18.124.157 processing hash 316 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=503 172.18.124.157 processing SA payload 317 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=206 172.18.124.157 SA Payload Decode : DOI : IPSEC (1) Situation : Identity Only (1) Length : 48 320 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=207 172.18.124.157 Proposal Decode: Proposal # : 1 Protocol ID : ESP (3) #of Transforms: 1 Spi : DA 16 3F E4 Length : 36 324 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=208 172.18.124.157 Transform # 1 Decode for Proposal # 1: Transform # : 1 Transform ID : DES-CBC (2) Length : 24 326 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=8 IKEDECODE/0 RPT=209 172.18.124.157 Phase 2 SA Attribute Decode for Transform # 1: Life Time : 28800 seconds Encapsulation : Tunnel (1) HMAC Algorithm: SHA (2) 329 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=127 172.18.124.157 processing nonce payload 330 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=128 172.18.124.157 Processing ID 331 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=129 172.18.124.157 Processing ID 332 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=504 172.18.124.157 loading all IPSEC SAs 333 02/13/2001 14:21:31.000 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=130 172.18.124.157 Generating Quick Mode Key! 334 02/13/2001 14:21:31.010 SEV=9 IKEDBG/1 RPT=131 172.18.124.157 Generating Quick Mode Key! 335 02/13/2001 14:21:31.010 SEV=7 IKEDBG/0 RPT=505 172.18.124.157 Loading subnet: Dst: 10.32.50.0 mask: 255.255.255.0 Src: 192.168.1.0 mask: 255.255.255.0 337 02/13/2001 14:21:31.010 SEV=4 IKE/49 RPT=7 172.18.124.157 Security negotiation complete for LAN-to-LAN Group (172.18.124.157) Initiator, Inbound SPI = 0x08201539, Outbound SPI = 0xda163fe4 339 02/13/2001 14:21:31.010 SEV=9 IKEDBG/0 RPT=506 172.18.124.157 oakley constructing final quick mode 340 02/13/2001 14:21:31.010 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=507 172.18.124.157 SENDING Message (msgid=23bc1709) with payloads : HDR + HASH (8) ... total length : 76 342 02/13/2001 14:21:31.010 SEV=8 IKEDBG/7 RPT=7 IKE got a KEY_ADD msg for SA: SPI = 0xda163fe4 343 02/13/2001 14:21:31.010 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=508 pitcher: rcv KEY_UPDATE, spi 0x8201539 344 02/13/2001 14:21:31.890 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=509 pitcher: recv KEY_SA_ACTIVE spi 0x8201539 345 02/13/2001 14:21:31.890 SEV=8 IKEDBG/0 RPT=510 KEY_SA_ACTIVE no old rekey centry found with new spi 0x8201539, mess_id 0x0
Revisión | Fecha de publicación | Comentarios |
---|---|---|
1.0 |
11-Dec-2001 |
Versión inicial |