Operate and Troubleshoot DHCP Snooping on Catalyst 9000 Switches

Contents

Introduction
<u>Prerequisites</u>
Requirements
Components Used
Background Information
DHCP Snooping
DHCP Snooping Operation
Topology
Configure
Verify
Troubleshoot
Troubleshoot Software
Troubleshoot Punt/Path Traffic (CPU)
Troubleshoot Hardware
<u>CPU Path Packet Capture</u>
<u>Useful Traces</u>
Syslogs and Explanations
DHCP Snooping Caveats
SDA Border DHCP Snooping
Related Information

Introduction

This document describes how to operate and troubleshoot DHCP Snooping on Catalyst 9000 series switches.

Prerequisites

Requirements

Cisco recommends that you have knowledge of these topics:

- Catalyst 9000 Series Switches Architecture
- Cisco IOS® XE Software Architecture

Components Used

The information in this document is based on these software and hardware versions:

• C9200

- C9300
- C9400
- C9500
- C9600

Cisco IOS® XE 16.12.X

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, ensure that you understand the potential impact of any command.



Note: Consult the appropriate configuration guide for the commands that are used to enable these features on other Cisco platforms.

Background Information

DHCP Snooping

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Snooping is a security feature used to check DHCP traffic to block any malicious DHCP packet. It acts as a firewall between untrusted user ports and DHCP server ports on the network to prevent malicious DHCP servers in the network as this can cause a denial of service.

DHCP Snooping Operation

DHCP Snooping works with the concept of trusted and untrusted interfaces. Through the path of the DHCP traffic, the switch verifies the DHCP packets received on the interfaces and keep a track of the expected DHCP Server packets (OFFER & ACK) over trusted interfaces. In other words, untrusted interfaces block DHCP Server packets.

DHCP Packets are blocked on untrusted interfaces.

- A packet from a DHCP server, such as a DHCPOFFER, DHCPACK, DHCPNAK, or DHCPLEASEQUERY packet, is received from outside the network or firewall. This prevents a rogue DHCP server from an attack to the network on untrusted ports.
- A packet received on an untrusted interface, and the source MAC address and the DHCP client hardware address do not match. This prevents spoof of DHCP packets from a rogue client that could create a denial of service attack on a DHCP server.
- A DHCPRELEASE or DHCPDECLINE broadcast message that has a MAC address in the DHCP snooping binding database, but the interface information in the binding database does not match the interface on which the message was received. This prevents denial of service attacks on clients.
- A DHCP packet forwarded by a DHCP relay agent that includes a relay-agent IP address that is not 0.0.0.0, or the relay agent forwards a packet that includes option-82 information to an untrusted port. This prevents spoof of relay agent information on the network.

The switch where you configure DHCP Snooping builds a DHCP Snooping table or DHCP binding database. This table is used to keep a track of the IP addresses assigned from a legitimate DHCP server. The binding database is also used by other IOS security features such as Dynamic ARP Inspection and IP Source Guard.

Note: To allow DHCP Snooping to work correctly, ensure you trust all the uplink ports toward reach

 \mathbf{N} the DHCP server and untrust the end-user ports.

Topology



Configure

Global Configuration

<#root>

- Enable DHCP snooping globally on the switch switch(config)#
- ip dhcp snooping
- Designate ports that forward traffic toward the DHCP server as trusted switch(config-if)#

ip dhcp snooping trust

(Additional verification)

- List uplink ports according to the topology, ensure all the uplink ports toward the DHCP server a trusted

- List the port where the Legitimate DHCP Server is connected (include any Secondary DHCP Server)

- Ensure that no other port is configured as trusted
- 3. Configure DHCP rate limiting on each untrusted port (Optional)
 switch(config-if)#
- ip dhcp snooping limit rate 10 << ---- 10 packets per second (pps)
- 4. Enable DHCP snooping in specific VLAN
 switch(config)#
- ip dhcp snooping vlan 10
- << ---- Allow the switch to snoop the traffic for that specific VLAN
- 5. Enable the insertion and removal of option-82 information DHCP packets switch(config)#
- ip dhcp snooping information option
- <-- Enable insertion of option 82
 - switch(config)#
- no ip dhcp snooping information option
- <-- Disable insertion of option 82

Example

Legitimate DHCP Server Interface and Secondary DHCP Server, if available

Server Interface

interface FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/5
switchport mode access
switchport mode access vlan 11

ip dhcp snooping trust

end

Uplink interface

interface FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10
switchport mode trunk

ip dhcp snooping trust

end

```
User Interface
  << ----- All interfaces are UNTRUSTED by default
interface FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2
switchport access vlan 10
switchport mode access
ip dhcp snooping limit rate 10
  << ----- Optional</pre>
```

end

Note: To allow option-82 packets, you must enable ip dhcp snooping information option allowuntrusted.

Verify

Confirm if DHCP Snooping is enabled on the desired VLAN and ensure trusted and untrusted interfaces are well listed. If there is a rate configured, ensure it is listed as well.

<#root>

switch#show ip dhcp snooping

Switch DHCP snooping is

enabled

Switch DHCP gleaning is disabled DHCP snooping is configured on following VLANs:

10-11

DHCP

5

snooping is operational on following VLANs

<<---- Configured and operational on Vlan 10 & 11</pre>

10-11

```
DHCP snooping is configured on the following L3 Interfaces:
Insertion of option 82 is disabled
<<---- Option 82 can not be added to DHCP packet
  circuit-id default format: vlan-mod-port
  remote-id: 00a3.d144.1a80 (MAC)
Option 82 on untrusted port is not allowed
Verification of hwaddr field is enabled
Verification of giaddr field is enabled
DHCP snooping trust/rate is configured on the following Interfaces:
Interface
 Trusted
    Allow option Rate limit (pps)
-----
                             _____
                                         -----
                                                        _____
FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2
no
                         10
         no
<<--- Trust is NOT set on this interface
Custom circuit-ids:
FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10
yes
        yes
                        unlimited
<<--- Trust is set on this interface
Custom circuit-ids:
```

Once users receive an IP by DHCP, they are listed in this output.

- DHCP Snooping removes the entry in the database when the IP address lease expires or the switch receives a DHCPRELEASE message from the host.
- Ensure information listed for the end-user MAC address is correct.

<#root>

c9500#show ip dhcp snooping binding

MacAddressIpAddressLease(sec)TypeVLANInterface00:A3:D1:44:20:4610.0.0.3----------------------

This table lists the various commands that can be used to monitor DHCP Snooping information.

Command	Purpose				
	Displays only the dynamically configured bindings in the DHCP snooping binding database, also referred to as a binding table.				
show ip dhcp snooping binding	- Binding entry IP address				
show ip dhcp snooping binding [IP- address] [MAC-address] [interface	- Binding entry Mac address				
ethernet slot/port] [vlan-id]	- Binding entry input interface				
	- Binding entry VLAN				
show ip dhcp snooping database	Displays the DHCP snooping binding database status and statistics.				
show ip dhcp snooping statistics	Displays the DHCP snooping statistics in summary or detail form.				
show ip source binding	Displays the dynamically and statically configured bindings.				
	DHCP packet is sent to relay agent configured in the client VLAN via client VLAN SVI. If input queue shows drop or reach maximum limit, it is likely the DHCP packet from client was dropped and was not able to reach relay agent configured.				
	Note : Ensure drops are not seen in the input queue.				
show interface vlan xyz show buffer input-interface Vlan xyz dump	switch #show int vlan 670 Load for five secs: 13%/0%; one minute: 10%; five minutes: 10% Time source is NTP, 18:39:52.476 UTC Thu Sep 10 2020 VLAN670 is up, line protocol is up, Autostate Enabled Hardware is Ethernet SVI, address is 00fd.227a.5920 (bia 00fd.227a.5920) Description: ion_media_client Internet address is 10.27.49.254/23 MTU 1500 bytes, BW 1000000 Kbit/sec, DLY 10 usec, reliability 255/255, txload 1/255, rxload 1/255 Encapsulation ARPA, loopback not set Keepalive not supported ARP type: ARPA, ARP Timeout 04:00:00 Last input 03:01:29, output 00:00:02, output hang never Last clearing of "show interface" counters never Input queue: 375/375/4020251/0 (size/max/drops/flushes); Total				

Troubleshoot

Troubleshoot Software

Verify what the switch receives. These packets are processed at the CPU control-plane, so ensure you see the all packets in the inject and punt direction, and confirm if the information is correct.

Caution: Use the debug commands with caution. Please be aware many debug commands have impact on the live network and are only recommended to use in a lab environment when the issue is reproduced.

The Conditional Debug feature allows you to selectively enable debugs and logs for specific features based on a set of conditions you define. This is useful to contain debug information only for specific hosts or traffic.

A condition refers to a feature or identity, where identity could be an interface, IP Address, or a MAC address and so on..

Command **Purpose debug condition mac** <mac-address> Example: Configures conditional debugging for the MAC Address specified. switch#debug condition mac bc16.6509.3314 debug condition vlan <VLAN Id> Configures conditional debugging for the VLAN specified. Example: switch#debug condition vlan 10 debug condition interface <interface> Example: Configures conditional debugging for the interface specified. switch#debug condition interface twentyFiveGigE 1/0/8

How to enable the Conditional Debug feature for debugging packets and events when troubleshooting DHCP Snooping.

To debug DHCP Snooping, use the commands shown in this table.

Command	Purpose
---------	---------

debug dhcp [detail oper redundancy]	detail DHCP packet content oper DHCP internal OPER redundancy DHCP client redundancy support						
debug ip dhcp server packet detail	Decode message receptions and transmission in detail.						
debug ip dhcp server events	Report address assignments, lease expiration, and so on.						
debug ip dhcp snooping agent	Debug DHCP snooping database read and write.						
debug ip dhcp snooping event	Debug event between each components.						
debug ip dhcp snooping packet	Debug DHCP packet in dhcp snooping module.						

This is a partial sample output of the**debug ip dhcp snooping** command.

<#root>

Apr 14 16:16:46.835: DHCP_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet,

message type: DHCPDISCOVER, input interface: Fo1/0/2

, MAC da: ffff.ffff.ffff, MAC

sa: 00a3.d144.2046,

IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 0.0.0.0, DHCP ciaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP yiaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP siaddr: 0.0.0 Apr 14 16:16:46.835: DHCP_SNOOPING: bridge packet get invalid mat entry: FFFF.FFFF.FFFF, packet is floo

Apr 14 16:16:48.837: DHCP_SNOOPING:

received new DHCP packet from input interface (FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10)

Apr 14 16:16:48.837: DHCP_SNOOPING:

process new DHCP packet, message type: DHCPOFFER, input interface: Fo1/0/10,

MAC da: ffff.ffff, MAC

sa: 701f.539a.fe46,

IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 10.0.0.1, DHCP ciaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP yiaddr: 10.0.0.5, DHCP siaddr: 0.0 Apr 14 16:16:48.837: platform lookup dest vlan for input_if: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10, is NOT tunnel, Apr 14 16:16:48.837: DHCP_SNOOPING: direct forward dhcp replyto output port: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2. Apr 14 16:16:48.838: DHCP_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (FortyGigabitEthernet Apr 14 16:16:48.838: Performing rate limit check

Apr 14 16:16:48.838: DHCP_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet,

message type: DHCPREQUEST, input interface: Fo1/0/2,

MAC da: ffff.ffff, MAC

sa: 00a3.d144.2046,

IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP sa: 0.0.0.0, DHCP ciaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP yiaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP siaddr: 0.0.0 Apr 14 16:16:48.838: DHCP_SNOOPING: bridge packet get invalid mat entry: FFFF.FFFF, packet is floo Apr 14 16:16:48.839: DHCP_SNOOPING: received new DHCP packet from input interface (FortyGigabitEthernet

Apr 14 16:16:48.840: DHCP_SNOOPING: process new DHCP packet,

message type: DHCPACK, input interface: Fo1/0/10,

MAC da: ffff.ffff.ffff, MAC

sa: 701f.539a.fe46,

IP da: 255.255.255.255, IP

sa: 10.0.0.1,

DHCP ciaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP yiaddr: 10.0.0.5, DHCP siaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP giaddr: 0.0.0.0, DHCP chaddr: Apr 14 16:16:48.840: DHCP_SNOOPING: add binding on port FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2 ckt_id 0 FortyGigabit Apr 14 16:16:48.840: DHCP_SNOOPING: added entry to table (index 331)

Apr 14 16:16:48.840:

DHCP_SNOOPING: dump binding entry: Mac=00:A3:D1:44:20:46 Ip=10.0.0.5

Lease=86400 Type=dhcp-snooping

Vlan=10 If=FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2

Apr 14 16:16:48.840: No entry found for mac(00a3.d144.2046) vlan(10) FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2 Apr 14 16:16:48.840: host tracking not found for update add dynamic (10.0.0.5, 0.0.0.0, 00a3.d144.2046) Apr 14 16:16:48.840: platform lookup dest vlan for input_if: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10, is NOT tunnel, Apr 14 16:16:48.840: DHCP_SNOOPING: direct forward dhcp replyto output port: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2.

To debug DHCP Snooping events, use these steps:

Caution: Use the debug commands with caution. Please be aware many debug commands have impact on live network, and are only recommended to use in a lab environment when the issue is reproduced.

Summary Steps

- 1. enable
- 2. debug platform condition mac {mac-address }
- 3. debug platform condition start
- 4. show platform condition OR show debug
- 5. debug platform condition stop
- 6. show platform software trace message ios R0 reverse | include DHCP
- 7. clear platform condition all

Detailed Steps

	Command or Action	Purpose
Step 1	enable	Enables privileged EXEC mode.

	Command or Action	Purpose			
	Example: switch# enable	• Enter your password if prompted.			
Step 2	debug platform condition mac {mac-address} Example: switch#debug platform condition mac 0001.6509.3314	Configures conditional debugging for the MAC Address specified.			
Step 3	debug platform condition start Example: switch# debug platform condition start	Starts conditional debugging (this can start radioactive tracing if there is a match on one of the conditions).			
Step 4	<pre>show platform condition OR show debug Example: switch#show platform condition switch#show debug</pre>	Displays the current conditions set.			
Step 5	debug platform condition stop Example: switch# debug platform condition stop	Stops conditional debugging (this can stop radioactive tracing).			
Step 6	show platform software trace message ios R0 reverse include DHCP Example: switch#show platform software trace message ios R0 reverse include DHCP	Displays HP logs merged from the latest trace file.			
Step 7	clear platform condition all Example: switch# clear platform condition all	Clears all conditions.			

This is a partial sample output example of the **debug platform dhcp-snoop all** command.

debug platform dhcp-snoop all

DHCP Server UDP port

(67)

DHCP Client UDP port

(68)

RELEASE

Apr 14 16:44:18.629: pak->vlan_id = 10 Apr 14 16:44:18.629: dhcp packet src_ip(10.0.0.6) dest_ip(10.0.0.1) src_udp(68) dest_udp(67) src_mac(00 Apr 14 16:44:18.629: ngwc_dhcpsn_process_pak(305): Packet handedover to SISF on vlan 10 Apr 14 16:44:18.629: dhcp pkt processing routine is called for pak with SMAC = 00a3.d144.2046{mac} and

DISCOVER

Apr 14 16:44:24.637: dhcp packet src_ip(0.0.0.0) dest_ip(255.255.255.255) src_udp(68) dest_udp(67) src_ Apr 14 16:44:24.637: ngwc_dhcpsn_process_pak(305): Packet handedover to SISF on vlan 10 Apr 14 16:44:24.637: dhcp pkt processing routine is called for pak with SMAC = 00a3.d144.2046{mac} and Apr 14 16:44:24.637: sending dhcp packet out after processing with SMAC = 00a3.d144.2046{mac} and SRC_A Apr 14 16:44:24.638: pak->vlan_id = 10

OFFER

Apr 14 16:44:24.638: dhcp packet src_ip(10.0.0.1) dest_ip(255.255.255.255) src_udp(67) dest_udp(68) src Apr 14 16:44:24.638: ngwc_dhcpsn_process_pak(305): Packet handedover to SISF on vlan 10 Apr 14 16:44:24.638: dhcp pkt processing routine is called for pak with SMAC = 701f.539a.fe46{mac} and

REQUEST

```
Apr 14 16:44:24.638: ngwc_dhcpsn_process_pak(284): Packet handedover to SISF on vlan 10 c9500#dhcp pkt processing routine is called for pak with SMAC = 0a3.d144.2046{mac} and SRC_ADDR = 0.0.0
```

ACK

```
Apr 14 16:44:24.640: dhcp paket src_ip(10.10.10.1) dest_ip(255.255.255.255) src_udp(67) dest_udp(68) s
Apr 14 16:44:24.640: ngwc_dhcpsn_process_pak(284): Packet handedover to SISF on vlan 10dhcp pkt process
```

This table lists the various commands that can be used to debug DHCP Snooping in platform.

Caution: Use the debug commands with caution. Please be aware many debug commands have an impact on live network, and only are recommended to use in a lab environment when the issue is reproduced.

Command	Purpose			
switch#debug platform dhcp-snoop [all packet pd- shim]	allNGWC DHCP SnoopingpacketNGWC DHCP Snooping Packet DebugInfoNGWC DHCP Snooping IOS Shimpd-shimNGWC DHCP Snooping IOS ShimDebug Info			
switch#debug platform software infrastructure punt dhcp-snoop	Packets that are received on the FP that are punted to the control plane).			
switch# debug platform software infrastructure inject	Packets that are injected into the FP from the control plane.			

Troubleshoot Punt/Path Traffic (CPU)

Verify from FED perspective what traffic is received in each CPU queue (DHCP Snooping is a type of traffic that is processed by the control-plane).

- When the traffic comes into the switch, it is sent to CPU in the PUNT direction and is sent to the DHCP snoop queue.
- Once the traffic is processed by the switch, the traffic leaves via the INJECT direction. DHCP OFFER and ACK packets fall into theL2 control/legacy queue.

<#root>

c9500#show platform software fed switch active punt cause summary

Statistics for all causes

Cause	Cause Info	Rcvd	Dropped
21	RP<->QFP keepalive	8533	0
79	dhcp snoop	71	0 << If drop counter increases, there can be
96	Layer2 control protocols	45662	0
T03	snoop packets 		0

c9500#show platform software fed sw active inject cause summary

Cause Cause Info Rcvd Dropped

1 L2 control/legacy

Statistics for all causes

	128354 0	<<	dropped	counter	must	NOT	increase	
2	QFP destination look	kup 18		0				
5	QFP <->RP keepalive	858	85	0				
12	ARP request or respo	onse 68		0				
25	Layer2 frame to BD	81		0				

You can use this command to confirm the traffic that is punted to the CPU, and verify if DHCP Snooping drops traffic.

<#root>

c9500#

show platform software fed switch active punt cpuq rates

Punt Rate CPU Q Statistics

Packets per second averaged over 10 seconds, 1 min and 5 mins

=== Q	Queue	Rx	Rx	Rx	Drop	========= Drop	===== Drop
no	Name	10s	1min	5min	10s	1min	5min
0 (0	 0	 0	0	 0	·====== 0
1 (CPU_Q_L2_CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0	0
2 (CPU_Q_FORUS_TRAFFIC	0	0	0	0	0	0
3 (CPU_Q_ICMP_GEN	0	0	0	0	0	0
4 (CPU_Q_ROUTING_CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0	0
5 (CPU_Q_FORUS_ADDR_RESOLUTION	0	0	0	0	0	0
6 (CPU_Q_ICMP_REDIRECT	0	0	0	0	0	0
7 (CPU_Q_INTER_FED_TRAFFIC	0	0	0	0	0	0
8 (PU_Q_L2LVX_CONTROL_PKT	0	0	0	0	0	0
9 (PU_Q_EWLC_CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	CPU_Q_EWLC_DATA	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	CPU_Q_L2LVX_DATA_PKT	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	CPU_Q_BROADCAST	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	CPU_Q_LEARNING_CACHE_OVFL	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	CPU_Q_SW_FORWARDING	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	CPU_Q_TOPOLOGY_CONTROL	2	2	2	0	0	0
16	CPU_Q_PROTO_SNOOPING	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	CPU_Q_DHCP_SNOOPING						
0	0 0 0 0						
	0 << drop counter must	t NOT ir	ncrease				
18	CPU_Q_TRANSIT_TRAFFIC	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	CPU_Q_RPF_FAILED	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	CPU_Q_MCAST_END_STATION_SERVICE	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	CPU_Q_LOGGING	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	CPU_Q_PUNT_WEBAUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	CPU_Q_HIGH_RATE_APP	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	CPU_Q_EXCEPTION	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	CPU_Q_SYSTEM_CRITICAL	8	8	8	0	0	0
26	CPU_Q_NFL_SAMPLED_DATA	0	0	0	0	0	0
27	CPU_Q_LOW_LATENCY	0	0	0	0	0	0

28 CPU_Q_EGR_EXCEPTION	0	0	0	0	0	0
29 CPU_Q_FSS	0	0	0	0	0	0
30 CPU_Q_MCAST_DATA	0	0	0	0	0	0
31 CPU_Q_GOLD_PKT	0	0	0	0	0	0

Troubleshoot Hardware

Forwarding Engine Driver (FED)

FED is the driver that programs the ASIC. FED commands are used to verify that hardware and software states match.

Obtain the DI_Handle value.

• The DI handle refers to the destination index for a specific port.

<#root>	
c9500#show platform software fed switch active security-fed dhcp-snoop vlan vlan-id 10	
Platform Security DHCP Snooping Vlan Information	
Value of Snooping DI handle	
is::	
0x7F7FAC23E438 << If DHCP Snooping is not enabled the hardware handle can not be prese	nt
Port Trust Mode	

FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10

trust <<---- Ensure TRUSTED ports are listed

Check the IFM mapping to determine the ASIC and Core of the ports.

• IFM is an internal interface index mapped to a specific port/core/asic.

<#root>

c9500#show platform software fed switch active ifm mappings

Interface IF_ID Inst Asic Core Port SubPort Mac Cntx LPN GPN Type Active FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10

oxa								
	3							
1	1							
	1	0	4	4	2	2	NIF	Y

Use the DI_Handle to get the hardware index.

<#root>

c9500#show platform hardware fed switch active fwd-asic abstraction print-resource-handle 0x7F7FAC23E438

```
Handle:0x7f7fac23e438 Res-Type:ASIC_RSC_DI Res-Switch-Num:255 Asic-Num:255 Feature-ID:AL_FID_DHCPSNOOPI priv_ri/priv_si Handle: (nil)Hardware Indices/Handles:
```

index0:0x5f03

```
mtu_index/l3u_ri_index0:0x0 index1:0x5f03 mtu_index/l3u_ri_index1:0x0 index2:0x5f03 mtu_index/l3u_ri_i
<SNIP>
```

```
<-- Index is 0x5f03
```

Convert from hexadecimal the index value 0x5f03 to decimal.

0x5f03 = 24323

<#root>

Use this index value in decimal, and the ASIC and Core values in this command to see what flags are set for the port.

```
c9500#show platform hardware fed switch 1 fwd-asic regi read register-name SifDestinationIndexTable-2432
asic
core
for asic 1 core 1
Module 0 - SifDestinationIndexTable[0][
24323
c-- the decimal hardware index matches 0x5f03 = 24323
```

```
copySegment0 :
```

0x1 <<---- If you find this as 0x0, means that the traffic is not forwarded out of this port. (refer to

CSCvi39202)copySegment1 : 0x1
dpuSegment0 : 0x0
dpuSegment1 : 0x0
ecUnicast : 0x0
etherChannel0 : 0x0
etherChannel1 : 0x0
hashPtr1 : 0x0
stripSegment : 0x0

Ensure DHCP Snooping is enabled for the specific VLAN.

<#root>

c9500#show platform software fed switch 1 vlan 10

VLAN Fed Information

Vlan Id IF Id STP Handle L3 IF Handle LE Handle SVI IF _____ 10 0x000000000420011 0x00007f7fac235fa8 0x00007f7fac236798 0x0000000000000 0x00000000000000 15 c9500# show platform hardware fed switch active fwd-asic abstraction print-resource-handle 0x00007f7fac235fa8 1 <<---- Last number might be 1 or 0, 1 means detailed, 0 means brief output Handle:0x7f7fac235fa8 Res-Type:ASIC_RSC_VLAN_LE Res-Switch-Num:255 Asic-Num:255 Feature-ID:AL_FID_L2 Lk priv_ri/priv_si Handle: (nil)Hardware Indices/Handles: index0:0xf mtu_index/l3u_ri_index0:0x0 sm handle Cookie length: 56 Detailed Resource Information (ASIC_INSTANCE# 0) ------LEAD_VLAN_IGMP_MLD_SNOOPING_ENABLED_IPV4 value 1 Pass <<---- Verify the highlighted values, if any are LEAD_VLAN_IGMP_MLD_SNOOPING_ENABLED_IPV6 value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_ARP_OR_ND_SNOOPING_ENABLED_IPV4 value 1 Pass LEAD_VLAN_ARP_OR_ND_SNOOPING_ENABLED_IPV6 value 1 Pass LEAD_VLAN_BLOCK_L2_LEARN value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_CONTENT_MATCHING_ENABLED value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_DEST_MOD_INDEX_TVLAN_LE value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_DHCP_SNOOPING_ENABLED_IPV4 value 1 Pass

LEAD_VLAN_DHCP_SNOOPING_ENABLED_IPV6 value 1 Pass LEAD_VLAN_ENABLE_SECURE_VLAN_LEARNING_IPV4 value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_ENABLE_SECURE_VLAN_LEARNING_IPV6 value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EPOCH value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_L2_PROCESSING_STP_TCN value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_L2FORWARD_IPV4_MULTICAST_PKT value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_L2FORWARD_IPV6_MULTICAST_PKT value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_L3_IF_LE_INDEX_PRIO value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_L3IF_LE_INDEX value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_LOOKUP_VLAN value 15 Pass LEAD_VLAN_MCAST_LOOKUP_VLAN value 15 Pass LEAD_VLAN_RIET_OFFSET value 4095 Pass LEAD_VLAN_SNOOPING_FLOODING_ENABLED_IGMP_OR_MLD_IPV4 value 1 Pass LEAD_VLAN_SNOOPING_FLOODING_ENABLED_IGMP_OR_MLD_IPV6 value 1 Pass LEAD_VLAN_SNOOPING_PROCESSING_STP_TCN_IGMP_OR_MLD_IPV4 value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_SNOOPING_PROCESSING_STP_TCN_IGMP_OR_MLD_IPV6 value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_VLAN_CLIENT_LABEL value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_VLAN_CONFIG value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_VLAN_FLOOD_ENABLED value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_VLAN_ID_VALID value 1 Pass LEAD_VLAN_VLAN_LOAD_BALANCE_GROUP value 15 Pass LEAD_VLAN_VLAN_ROLE value 2 Pass LEAD_VLAN_VLAN_FLOOD_MODE_BITS value 3 Pass LEAD_VLAN_LVX_VLAN value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_DEJAVU_CANON value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_INGRESS_VLAN_MODE value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_LOOKUP_VLAN value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_LVX_VLAN value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_SGACL_DISABLED value 3 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_VLAN_CLIENT_LABEL value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_VLAN_ID_VALID value 1 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_VLAN_LOAD_BALANCE_GROUP value 15 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_INTRA_POD_BCAST value 0 Pass

LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_DHCP_SNOOPING_ENABLED_IPV4 value 1 Pass

LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_DHCP_SNOOPING_ENABLED_IPV6 value 1 Pass LEAD_VLAN_EGRESS_VXLAN_FLOOD_MODE value 0 Pass LEAD_VLAN_MAX value 0 Pass <SNIP>

This table lists the various common Punject show/debug commands that can be used to trace the path of DHCP packet on a live network.

Common Punt / Inject show & debug commands

debug plat soft fed swit acti inject add-filter cause 255 sub_cause 0 src_mac 0 0 0 dst_mac 0 0 0 src_ipv4 192.168.12.1 dst_ipv4 0.0.0.0 if_id 0xf

set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] inject verbose --- > use filter command shown to scope the traces to this specific host

set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] inject debug boot --- > for reload

set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] punt noise

show platform software fed [switch<num|active|standby>] inject cause summary show platform software fed [switch<num|active|standby>] punt cause summary show platform software fed [switch<num|active|standby>] inject cpuq 0 show platform software fed [switch<num|active|standby>] punt cpuq 17 (dhcp queue) show platform software fed [switch<num|active|standby>] active inject packet-capture det show platform software infrastructure inject show platform software infrastructure punt show platform software infrastructure lsmpi driver debug platform software infra punt dhcp debug platform software infra inject

These commands are useful to check if any DHCP packet is received for a particular client.

- This feature allows you to capture all DHCP snooping communication associated with a given client mac address that is processed by the CPU via the IOS-DHCP software.
- This functionality is supported for both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic.
- This feature is enabled automatically.

Note: These commands are available from Cisco IOS XE Gibraltar 16.12.X.

switch#show platform dhcpsnooping client stats {mac-address}

switch#show platform dhcpv6snooping ipv6 client stats {mac-address}

<#root>

C9300#

show platform dhcpsnooping client stats 0000.1AC2.C148

DHCPSN: DHCP snoop DHCPD: DHCP proto L2FWD: Transmit F FWD: Transmit F Packet Trace for o	ving server ocol daemen Yacket to driver in Yacket to driver	L2 format			
Timestamp	Destination MAC	Destination Ip	VLAN	Message	Handler:Action
06-27-2019 20:48:2	28 FFFF.FFFF.FFFF	255.255.255.255	 88	DHCPDISCOVER	PUNT:RECEIVED
06-27-2019 20:48:2	8 FFFF.FFFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPDISCOVER	PUNT:TO_DHCPSN
06-27-2019 20:48:2	8 FFFF.FFFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPDISCOVER	BRIDGE:RECEIVED
06-27-2019 20:48:2	8 FFFF.FFFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPDISCOVER	BRIDGE:TO_DHCPD
06-27-2019 20:48:2	8 FFFF.FFFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPDISCOVER	BRIDGE:TO_INJECT
06-27-2019 20:48:2	8 FFFF.FFFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPDISCOVER	L2INJECT:TO_FWD
06-27-2019 20:48:2	28 0000.0000.0000	192.168.1.1	0	DHCPDISCOVER	INJECT:RECEIVED
06-27-2019 20:48:2	8 0000.0000.0000	192.168.1.1	0	DHCPDISCOVER	INJECT:TO L2FWD

06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.0000.0000	10.1.1.3	0	DHCPOFFER	INJECT:RECEIVED
06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.1AC2.C148	10.1.1.3	0	DHCPOFFER	INTERCEPT:RECEIVED
06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.1AC2.C148	10.1.1.3	88	DHCPOFFER	INTERCEPT:TO_DHCPSN
06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.1AC2.C148	10.1.1.3	88	DHCPOFFER	INJECT: CONSUMED
06-27-2019	20:48:30	FFFF.FFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPREQUEST	PUNT:RECEIVED
06-27-2019	20:48:30	FFFF.FFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPREQUEST	PUNT:TO_DHCPSN
06-27-2019	20:48:30	FFFF.FFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPREQUEST	BRIDGE:RECEIVED
06-27-2019	20:48:30	FFFF.FFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPREQUEST	BRIDGE:TO_DHCPD
06-27-2019	20:48:30	FFFF.FFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPREQUEST	BRIDGE:TO_INJECT
06-27-2019	20:48:30	FFFF.FFF.FFF	255.255.255.255	88	DHCPREQUEST	L2INJECT:TO_FWD
06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.0000.0000	192.168.1.1	0	DHCPREQUEST	INJECT:RECEIVED
06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.0000.0000	192.168.1.1	0	DHCPREQUEST	INJECT:TO_L2FWD
06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.0000.0000	10.1.1.3	0	DHCPACK	INJECT:RECEIVED
06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.1AC2.C148	10.1.1.3	0	DHCPACK	INTERCEPT:RECEIVED
06-27-2019	20:48:30	0000.1AC2.C148	10.1.1.3	88	DHCPACK	INTERCEPT: TO_DHCPSN

Use these commands to clear the trace.

switch#clear platform dhcpsnooping pkt-trace ipv4

switch#clear platform dhcpsnooping pkt-trace ipv6

CPU Path Packet Capture

Confirm if DHCP Snooping packets arrive and leave the control-plane properly.

Note: For additional references about how to use Forwarding Engine Driver CPU capture tool, refer to Further Reading section.

<#root>

debug platform software fed

[switch<num|active|standby>]

punt/inject

packet-capture start

```
debug platform software fed
```

[switch<num|active|standby>]

punt/inject

packet-capture stop

show platform software fed

[switch<num|active|standby>]

punt/inject

packet-capture brief

PUNT

DISCOVER

```
----- Punt Packet Number: 16, Timestamp: 2021/04/14 19:10:09.924 -----
interface :
physical: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2
[if-id: 0x0000000a], pal: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2 [if-id: 0x0000000a]
metadata : cause: 79
[dhcp snoop],
sub-cause: 11, q-no: 17, linktype: MCP_LINK_TYPE_IP [1]
ether hdr : dest mac: ffff.fff.fff,
src mac: 00a3.d144.2046
ether hdr : ethertype: 0x0800 (IPv4)
ipv4 hdr : dest ip: 255.255.255.255, src ip: 0.0.0.0
ipv4 hdr : packet len: 347, ttl: 255, protocol: 17 (UDP)
udp hdr : dest port:
67
, src port:
68
OFFER
----- Punt Packet Number: 23, Timestamp: 2021/04/14 19:10:11.926 -----
interface :
physical: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10
[if-id: 0x00000012], pal: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10 [if-id: 0x00000012]
metadata : cause: 79
[dhcp snoop]
, sub-cause: 11, q-no: 17, linktype: MCP_LINK_TYPE_IP [1]
ether hdr : dest mac: ffff.fff.fff,
src mac: 701f.539a.fe46
ether hdr : vlan: 10, ethertype: 0x8100
ipv4 hdr : dest ip: 255.255.255.255,
src ip: 10.0.0.1
ipv4 hdr : packet len: 330, ttl: 255, protocol: 17 (UDP)
udp hdr : dest port:
```

67

REQUEST

----- Punt Packet Number: 24, Timestamp: 2021/04/14 19:10:11.927 ----interface : physical: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2 [if-id: 0x0000000a], pal: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2 [if-id: 0x0000000a] metadata : cause: 79 [dhcp snoop] , sub-cause: 11, q-no: 17, linktype: MCP_LINK_TYPE_IP [1] ether hdr : dest mac: ffff.ffff.ffff, src mac: 00a3.d144.2046 ether hdr : ethertype: 0x0800 (IPv4) ipv4 hdr : dest ip: 255.255.255.255, src ip: 0.0.0.0 ipv4 hdr : packet len: 365, ttl: 255, protocol: 17 (UDP) udp hdr : dest port: 67 , src port: 68 ACK ----- Punt Packet Number: 25, Timestamp: 2021/04/14 19:10:11.929 ----interface : physical: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10 [if-id: 0x00000012], pal: FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/10 [if-id: 0x00000012] metadata : cause: 79 [dhcp snoop] , sub-cause: 11, q-no: 17, linktype: MCP_LINK_TYPE_IP [1] ether hdr : dest mac: ffff.ffff.ffff, src mac: 701f.539a.fe46 ether hdr : vlan: 10, ethertype: 0x8100 ipv4 hdr : dest ip: 255.255.255.255, src ip: 10.0.0.1 ipv4 hdr : packet len: 330, ttl: 255, protocol: 17 (UDP)

```
udp hdr : dest port:
68
, src port:
67
### INJECT ###
DISCOVER
----- Inject Packet Number: 33, Timestamp: 2021/04/14 19:53:01.273 -----
interface : pal:
FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2
 [if-id: 0x000000a]
metadata : cause: 25 [Layer2 frame to BD], sub-cause: 1, q-no: 0, linktype: MCP_LINK_TYPE_IP [1]
ether hdr : dest mac: ffff.ffff.ffff,
src mac: 00a3.d144.2046
ether hdr : ethertype: 0x0800 (IPv4)
ipv4 hdr : dest ip: 255.255.255.255, src ip: 0.0.0.0
ipv4 hdr : packet len: 347, ttl: 255, protocol: 17 (UDP)
udp hdr : dest port:
67
, src port:
68
OFFER
----- Inject Packet Number: 51, Timestamp: 2021/04/14 19:53:03.275 -----
interface : pal:
FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2
[if-id: 0x000000a]
metadata : cause: 1 [L2 control/legacy], sub-cause: 0, q-no: 0, linktype: MCP_LINK_TYPE_LAYER2 [10]
ether hdr : dest mac: ffff.fff.fff,
src mac: 701f.539a.fe46
ether hdr : ethertype: 0x0800 (IPv4)
ipv4 hdr : dest ip: 255.255.255.255,
src ip: 10.0.0.1
ipv4 hdr : packet len: 330, ttl: 255, protocol: 17 (UDP)
```

```
udp hdr : dest port:
68,
src port:
67
REQUEST
----- Inject Packet Number: 52, Timestamp: 2021/04/14 19:53:03.276 -----
interface : pal:
FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2
[if-id: 0x000000a]
metadata : cause: 25 [Layer2 frame to BD], sub-cause: 1, q-no: 0, linktype: MCP_LINK_TYPE_IP [1]
ether hdr : dest mac: ffff.fff.fff,
src mac: 00a3.d144.2046
ether hdr : ethertype: 0x0800 (IPv4)
ipv4 hdr : dest ip: 255.255.255.255, src ip: 0.0.0.0
ipv4 hdr : packet len: 365, ttl: 255, protocol: 17 (UDP)
udp hdr : dest port:
67
, src port:
68
ACK
----- Inject Packet Number: 53, Timestamp: 2021/04/14 19:53:03.278 -----
interface : pal:
FortyGigabitEthernet1/0/2
 [if-id: 0x000000a]
metadata : cause: 1 [L2 control/legacy], sub-cause: 0, q-no: 0, linktype: MCP_LINK_TYPE_LAYER2 [10]
ether hdr : dest mac: ffff.ffff.ffff,
src mac: 701f.539a.fe46
ether hdr : ethertype: 0x0800 (IPv4)
ipv4 hdr : dest ip: 255.255.255.255,
src ip: 10.0.0.1
ipv4 hdr : packet len: 330, ttl: 255, protocol: 17 (UDP)
udp hdr : dest port:
68
, src port:
67
```

Useful Traces

These are binary traces which display events per process or component. In this example, the traces show information about the DHCPSN component.

• The traces can be manually rotated, which means that you can create a new file before you start to troubleshoot so that it contains cleaner information.

<#root>
9500#
request platform software trace rotate all
9500#
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] dhcpsn verbose
c9500#show logging proc fed internal | inc dhcp

<<---- DI_Handle must match with the output which retrieves the DI handle

2021/04/14 19:24:19.159536 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (info):

VLAN event on vlan 10, enabled 1

2021/04/14 19:24:19.159975 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug): Program trust ports for this vlan 2021/04/14 19:24:19.159978 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug):

```
2021/04/14 19:24:19.160029 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug): trusted_if_q size=1 for vlan=10
2021/04/14 19:24:19.160041 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (ERR): update ri has failed vlanid[10]
2021/04/14 19:24:19.160042 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug): vlan mode changed to enable
2021/04/14 19:24:27.507358 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [23451]: (debug): get di for vlan_id 10
2021/04/14 19:24:27.507365 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [23451]: (debug): Allocated rep_ri for vlan_id 10
2021/04/14 19:24:27.507366 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [inject] [23451]: (verbose): Changing di_handle from 0x7f7fac
```

0x7f7fac23e438

```
by dhcp snooping
2021/04/14 19:24:27.507394 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [inject] [23451]: (debug): TX: getting REP RI from dhcpsn fai
2021/04/14 19:24:29.511774 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [23451]: (debug): get di for vlan_id 10
2021/04/14 19:24:29.511780 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [23451]: (debug): Allocated rep_ri for vlan_id 10
2021/04/14 19:24:29.511780 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [inject] [23451]: (verbose): Changing di_handle from 0x7f7fac
```

0x7f7fac23e438

by dhcp snooping 2021/04/14 19:24:29.511802 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [inject] [23451]: (debug): TX: getting REP RI from dhcpsn fai c9500#show logging proc fed internal | inc dhcp

2021/04/14 20:13:56.742637 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (info):

VLAN event on vlan 10

, enabled 0
2021/04/14 20:13:56.742783 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug): vlan mode changed to disable
2021/04/14 20:14:13.948214 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (info): VLAN event on vlan 10, enabled 1
2021/04/14 20:14:13.948686 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug):

Program trust ports for this vlan

2021/04/14 20:14:13.948688 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug):

GPN (10) if_id (0x00000000000012) <<---- if_id must match with the TRUSTED port

```
2021/04/14 20:14:13.948740 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug): trusted_if_q size=1 for vlan=10
2021/04/14 20:14:13.948753 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (ERR): update ri has failed vlanid[10]
2021/04/14 20:14:13.948754 {fed_F0-0}{1}: [dhcpsn] [17035]: (debug): vlan mode changed to enable
```

Suggested Traces

set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] pm_tdl verbose
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] pm_vec verbose
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] pm_vlan verbose

INJECT

```
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] dhcpsn verbose
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] asic_app verbose
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] inject verbose
```

PUNT

```
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] dhcpsn verbose
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] asic_app verbse
set platform software trace fed [switch<num|active|standby>] punt ver
```

Syslogs and Explanations

Violations of DHCP rate limits.

Explanation: DHCP snooping detected a DHCP packet rate-limit violation on the specified interface.

DHCP Server spoofing on an untrusted port.

Explanation: The DHCP snooping feature discovered certain types of DHCP messages not allowed on the untrusted interface, which indicates some host trying to act as a DHCP server.

%DHCP_SNOOPING-5-DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT: DHCP_SNOOPING drop message on untrusted port, message ty

Layer 2 MAC address does not match the MAC address inside DHCP request.

Explanation: The DHCP snooping feature attempted MAC address validation and the check failed. The source MAC address in the Ethernet header does not match the address in the chaddr field of the DHCP request message. There can be a malicious host that tries to carry out a denial of service attack on the DHCP server.

%DHCP_SNOOPING-5-DHCP_SNOOPING_MATCH_MAC_FAIL: DHCP_SNOOPING drop message because the chaddr doesn't ma

Option 82 insertion issue.

Explanation: The DHCP snooping feature discovered a DHCP packet with option values not allowed on the untrusted port, which indicates some host trying to act as a DHCP relay or server.

%DHCP_SNOOPING-5-DHCP_SNOOPING_NONZERO_GIADDR: DHCP_SNOOPING drop message with non-zero giaddr or option

Layer 2 MAC address received on wrong port.

Explanation: The DHCP snooping feature has detected a host trying to carry out a denial of service attack on another host in the network.

%DHCP_SNOOPING-5-DHCP_SNOOPING_FAKE_INTERFACE: DHCP_SNNOPING drop message with mismatched source interface.

DHCP messages received on the untrusted interface.

Explanation: The DHCP snooping feature discovered certain types of DHCP messages not allowed on the untrusted interface, which indicates some host trying to act as a DHCP server.

%DHCP_SNOOPING-5-DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT: DHCP_SNOOPING drop message on untrusted port: GigabitEth

DHCP Snooping transfer failed. Unable to access URL.

Explanation: The DHCP snooping binding transfer failed.

%DHCP_SNOOPING-4-AGENT_OPERATION_FAILED: DHCP snooping binding transfer failed. Unable to access URL

DHCP S	Snooping	Caveats
--------	----------	---------

Cisco Bug ID Number	Description
<u>CSCvi39202</u>	DHCP fails when DHCP snooping trust is enabled on uplink etherchannel.
<u>CSCvp49518</u>	DHCP Snooping database is not refreshed after reload.
<u>CSCvk16813</u>	DHCP client traffic dropped with DHCP snooping and port-channel or cross stack uplinks.
<u>CSCvd51480</u>	Unbinding ip DHCP snooping and device-tracking.
<u>CSCvm55401</u>	DHCP snooping can drop DHCP option 82 packets w/ ip DHCP snooping information option allow-untrusted.
CSCvx25841	DHCP snooping trust state breaks when there is a change in REP segment.
<u>CSCvs15759</u>	DHCP server sends out a NAK packet during DHCP renewal process.
CSCvk34927	DHCP snooping table not updated from DHCP snooping DB file upon reload.

SDA Border DHCP Snooping

DHCP Snooping Statistics CLI.

A new CLI available for SDA to verify DHCP snooping statistics.

Note: For additional references about Cisco SD-Access Fabric Edge DHCP Process/Packet Flow and Decoding, refer to the guide in the Related Information section.

switch#show platform fabric border dhcp snooping ipv4 statistics

switch#show platform fabric border dhcp snooping ipv6 statistics

<#root>

SDA-9300-BORDER#

show platform fabric border dhcp snooping ipv4 statistics

Timestamp	Source IP	Destination IP	Source Remote Locator	Lisp Instance ID	VLAN	PROCESS
08-05-2019 00:24:16	10.30.30.1	10.40.40.1	192.168.0.1	8189	88	10
08-05-2019 00:24:16	10.30.30.1	10.40.40.1	192.168.0.1	8189	88	11

SDA-9300-BORDER#

show platform fabric border dhcp snooping ipv6 statistics

Timestamp	Source IP	Destination IP	Source Remote Locator	Lisp Instand
08-05-2019 00:41:46 08-05-2019 00:41:47	11:11:11:11:11:11:11:1 11:11:11:11:11:11	22:22:22:22:22:22:22:1 22:22:22:22:22:22:22:1	192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3	8089 8089 8089

Related Information

IP Addressing Services Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Amsterdam 17.3.x (Catalyst 9200 Switches) IP Addressing Services Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Amsterdam 17.3.x (Catalyst 9300 Switches) IP Addressing Services Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Amsterdam 17.3.x (Catalyst 9400 Switches) IP Addressing Services Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Amsterdam 17.3.x (Catalyst 9500 Switches) IP Addressing Services Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Amsterdam 17.3.x (Catalyst 9500 Switches) IP Addressing Services Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE Amsterdam 17.3.x (Catalyst 9500 Switches) Cisco SD-Access Fabric Edge DHCP Process/Packet Flow and Decoding Configure FED CPU Packet Capture on Catalyst 9000 Switches Technical Support & Documentation - Cisco Systems